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There are currently over 900 million Facebook users worldwide (and 
counting).  With increased use of social networking comes new concerns for 
personal privacy and control of social networking information.  More and 
more, Facebook activity trickles its way into offline contexts, perhaps none 
more so than the employment context.  A new trend in the hiring process is 
social networking background checks, where some employers go so far as to 
request a candidate’s Facebook password.  Not only this, but the frequency of 
Facebook activity resulting in employment law disputes is increasing, and 
has even been found to constitute sufficient grounds for discipline and 
termination.  This thesis examines the current privacy protection given to 
social networking information in the context of the employment relationship, 
highlights problems with the current legal landscape in this regard, and 
offers an emerging theory, New Virtualism, as a conceptual basis for the 
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CHAPTER 1 Introduction 
The use of computers in the workplace has expanded dramatically over 
the past half-century or so.  Once upon a time, computers were used simply 
as devices for typing.  The vast majority of employees would not engage in 
computer use at all; rather, there would be people employed in 
administrative assistant positions for the specific purpose of typing.  As the 
technology evolved, the process of typing became more forgiving and because 
it required less specific expertise, more people began to engage in the typing 
process.  Over time, the functionality and use of computers in the workplace 
expanded, developing the capacity for data analysis and completion of other 
tasks that were formerly carried out by employees alone.  Then, computers 
became even more multi-faceted with increased storage capacity, word 
processors made typing documents easier than ever before, and it became 
practical and efficient for most employees to engage in computer use to carry 
out their everyday tasks.  Eventually, with the introduction of internet 
technology, not only are more and more people using computers and the 
internet on a daily basis at work, but more and more people are using 
computers and internet technology in their personal lives.  However, not only 
does this increased use of computers and internet technology present a 
convenient and efficient way to complete tasks at work and in one’s personal 
life, but the resulting degree of pervasiveness presented by such computer 




personal information on both personal and work computers has become the 
norm, rather than the exception.   
A relatively new way in which a growing number of individuals are 
using computers and internet technology is as a medium to socialize with one 
another.  While it is possible for people to socialize in any number of ways via 
computers and internet technology (e.g. email, message boards, etc.), social 
networking sites, specifically Facebook, have dramatically changed the 
manner and extent to which many people interact with one another online.  
As a result of the electronic, online nature of this form of social interaction, 
there exists on Facebook’s server a permanent record of the social activity of 
members of these virtual communities.  If someone were to gain access to this 
information, he or she has the potential to have access to some of the most 
intimate details of a person’s life – his or her likes and dislikes, who he or she 
interacts with, what they speak about, and the list goes on.  Nonetheless, 
despite this apparent risk, the number of people who choose to participate in 
social networking sites grows every day.  As a result, so to do the associated 
risks that come with participation in social networking.  Consequently, the 
legal protection that is afforded to our social networking information is vital – 
if the information collected about us on computers is not adequately 
protected, personal privacy can be essentially obliterated. 
Given the abundance of information that can be found out about an 




emerging practice where employers perform what is known as a ‘social media 
background checks,’ on job candidates – what these background checks 
amount to is simply “creeping”1 a candidate’s social networking profile.  Not 
only this, but during the employment relationship, employers are monitoring 
the social networking activities of employees, and more and more often social 
networking activity is becoming the basis of employment law disputes.  
The technology associated with these sites and the ability to record the 
information contained on computers through the use of computer software 
are progressing at an extremely rapid pace – as a result, personal privacy is 
in danger.  However, given the relative newness of this activity, courts and 
legal scholars are still struggling with just how to address and conceptualize 
an individual’s privacy interests and rights in his or her social networking 
activity in the employment context.  The purpose of this work is to assess how 
we are doing in this regard – whether we are getting it right.  Or, more 
accurately, the purpose of this work is to explain how we are getting it wrong. 
 In Chapter 2, I will set the stage as to why this issue is important – I 
will outline the role of employment law, examine the importance of 
socializing and privacy, and explore the notion of socializing via technology. 
For those readers who are unfamiliar with social networking, Chapter 3 will 
explain its “ins and outs” with a particular emphasis on the most popular 
social networking site, Facebook.  Chapter 4 will provide an overview of the 
                                                




current landscape of privacy law in Canada.  In Chapters 5 and 6, I will apply 
Canadian privacy law to the pre-employment and employment phases, 
respectively.  In Chapter 7, I will explain “New Virtualism,” an emerging 
area of scholarship that I contend presents a theoretical basis and framework 
for the way we should conceptualize the protection of social networking 
information in the employment context.  In Chapter 8, I will apply New 
Virtualist principles to the problems presented in Chapters 5 and 6.  And 
finally, in the Conclusion, I will summarize my findings and propose a 





CHAPTER 2 Setting The Stage: Employment, Privacy, and 
Socializing via Technology 
2.1  THE IMPORTANCE OF EMPLOYMENT LAW 
 Something that is important for a healthy society is to create an 
environment where people are able to work under good, humane, 
circumstances.  In contemporary Canadian society, it is not uncommon when 
meeting someone new to ask, “What do you do?,” or more specifically, “What 
do you do for a living?”  This is a perfectly normal, and acceptable question to 
ask someone.  What is sought by these questions is to find out the kind of 
work to which the person devotes much of his or her time, or what kind of job 
he or she works for subsistence.  The reason for asking could be curiosity, or 
simply making conversation; either way, the goal of such a question is to find 
out more about what the person does with his or her time.  Work, first and 
foremost, is a way for us to satisfy our material ‘wants’.  At its most basic 
level, our ‘wants’ are actually our ‘needs,’ in that they are what we need for 
survival (i.e. food, shelter, clothing, etc.).  Once our ‘needs’ are met, the 
amount and nature of a person’s work is often in some way dictated by the 
lifestyle he or she wishes to lead, or vice versa.  
Income generation has not always been the primary means by which a 
person obtained their livelihood.2  As late as the eighteenth century, for most 
                                                
2 Raymond Edward Pahl, “Editor’s Introduction: Historical Aspects of Work, 




people and families, subsistence was dependent upon a mix of task work at 
the household (for example, farming), as well as some income generating 
wage labour.3  It was not until the nineteenth century that “the notion that 
one should obtain most, if not all, of one’s material wants as a consumer by 
spending the money gained through employment [first] emerged.”4  In 
contemporary Canadian society, there are very few practicable opportunities 
for someone to earn their livelihood not within the societal institution of the 
employment relationship.5  As a result, “the means by which the personal 
meaning of work is attained are now effectively controlled by others.”6 
In Canada, where the needs of subsistence can be taken care of by a 
fraction of the population, leaving the rest to work providing services that are 
divorced from the imperatives of survival, work becomes more so about 
personal development and fulfillment than merely about physical survival.7  
As Beatty illustrates in the following passage, work is one of the principal 
modes of individual expression and identity in our society: 
At its most basic level, this personal end of the relationship is 
one of subsistence, of physical survival.  As we have noted, for 
most individuals in our society, their physical needs can only 
be satisfied within this institution.  However, at a more 
                                                                                                                                            
Edward Pahl, ed., On Work: Historical, Comparative and Theoretical 
Approaches (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988) 7 at 11-12 [On Work]. 
3 Pahl, On Work, ibid. 
4 Pahl, On Work, ibid. 
5 David Beatty, “Labour is Not a Commodity” in Barry Reiter & John Swan, 
eds., Studies in Contract Law (Toronto: Butterworths, 1980) 313 at 318-324 
[Labour is Not a Commodity]. 
6 Beatty, Labour is Not a Commodity, ibid at 321. 




sophisticated level, and reflecting the characterization of 
humans, for the most part, doers and makers, the identity 
aspect of employment is increasingly seen to serve deep 
psychological needs as well.  It recognizes the importance of 
providing the members of society with an opportunity to 
realize some sense of identity and meaning, some sense of 
worth in the community beyond that which can be taken from 
the material product of the institution.  As a vehicle which 
admits a person to the status of a contributing, productive, 
member of society, employment is seen as providing 
recognition of the individual’s being engaged in something 
worthwhile.  It gives the individual a sense of significance.8 
 
Contrast this with the following passage from sociologist William Julius 
Wilson on the effect of unemployment on people: 
In the absence of regular employment, a person lacks not only 
a place in which to work and the receipt of regular income but 
also a coherent organization of the present — that is, a system 
of concrete expectations and goals. Regular employment 
provides the anchor for the spatial and temporal aspects of 
daily life. It determines where you are going to be and when 
you are going to be there. In the absence of regular 
employment, life, including family life, becomes less coherent. 
Persistent unemployment and irregular employment hinder 
rational planning in daily life, a necessary condition of 
adaptation to an industrial economy.9 
 
As can be seen from these two passages, employment is a very important part 
of an individual’s life – the employment relationship is a centrally 
organizational mechanism in society.  Employment not only provides people 
with a source of income, but it provides people with a sense of identity and 
purpose, as well as a sense of stability in their lives.  Suffice it to say, 
                                                
8 Beatty, Labour is Not a Commodity, supra at note 5, 324. 
9 WJ Wilson, “When Work Disappears: New Implications for Race and Urban 
Poverty in the Global Economy” (1999) Ethnic and Racial Studies volume 22 




employment is a major part of an individual’s life in contemporary Canadian 
society. 
 The nature and dynamics of the employment relationship within a 
society is not only important to the individuals within that society, but it is 
also important to the wellbeing of the society as a whole.  In an increasingly 
global economy, it can be said that there is a direct correlation between the 
productivity of a nation’s workforce and its economic prosperity, as well as its 
social and political environment.  Such environmental factors will strongly 
influence what kinds of demands are placed upon our workforce.  This will 
no-doubt affect the way we, as a society, view the purpose served by basic 
social institutions like the employment relationship, and in turn, affect the 
way in which they are regulated by law.10 
 In Canada, jurists and legislatures, “influenced by social evolution and 
human experience in this country, have created employment laws that reflect 
their views on what is required to ensure justice in the workplace and the 
redistribution of losses flowing out of the employment relationship.”11  What 
is considered in the evolution of employment law are the interests and 
situation of the employer, the interests and situation of the employee, the 
societal interests in employment as an institution, and parties external to the 
employment relationship, but who are nonetheless affected by the existence 
                                                
10 Beatty, Labour is Not a Commodity, supra at note 5, 318. 
11 Labour Law Casebook Group, Labour and Employment Law: Cases, 
Materials, and Commentary, (Toronto Irwin Law: 2004) 7th ed at 1-2 [Labour 




of the employment relationship.  Canadian labour and employment law is 
conventionally seen as consisting of three closely interrelated regimes.12 
 The first regime is the common law of employment, which basically 
treats the contract between the employee and the employer for the buying 
and selling of labour as the cornerstone of the employment relationship.13  
The principles of contract law alone, however, have proven insufficient in 
securing workplace justice.14  This is because there is an assumption in 
contract law that a contract is the result of relatively free bargaining between 
parties with relatively equal bargaining power.15  “For most workers, 
however, this assumption is not true; their employer has the power to dictate 
the terms of employment on a take it or leave it basis.”16  It is almost 
universally accepted by labour and employment lawyers and lawmakers that 
the employee suffers an inequality of bargaining power vis-à-vis an employer 
and an important purpose of labour and employment law is to balance out 
this inequality. 
 The second regime is the substantive approach to balancing out the 
inequality in bargaining power – which essentially means a statutory re-
                                                
12 Labour and Employment Law: Cases, Materials, and Commentary, ibid 
at1-1. 
13 Labour and Employment Law: Cases, Materials, and Commentary, ibid at 
95. 
14 Labour and Employment Law: Cases, Materials, and Commentary, ibid at 
95. 
15 Labour and Employment Law: Cases, Materials, and Commentary, ibid at 
95. 





writing of the resulting employment contract.  These substantive 
interferences amount to enacting standards that will work to govern the 
employer-employee relationship.17  These include statutes such as human 
rights legislation, employment standards legislation, occupational health and 
safety legislation, etc.  They regulate such matters as hours of work, 
minimum wage, maternity leave, workplace standards, etc.  The idea behind 
these is that the state is ensuring that a social minimum is attained for 
workers through a ‘floor’ of basic standards.18 
 The third regime is to approach the balancing act that places emphasis 
on the collective power of employees – an area of law that is usually referred 
to as ‘labour law’ as opposed to ‘employment law.’  This is a way of turning up 
the bargaining power valve on the employee’s side through procedural means 
– we substitute the individual with the collective, and allow for collective 
bargaining with an employer.19  The idea is that there is strength in 
numbers, and opening up a procedure for employees to work together to 
negotiate a collective agreement with an employer is more likely to result in a 
contract that is the product of less unequal bargaining. 
 As can be seen by this brief overview of Canadian labour and 
employment law, an important purpose of said law is to strike a balance 
                                                
17 Labour and Employment Law: Cases, Materials, and Commentary, ibid at 
750. 
18 Brian Langille, “Labour Law is a Subset of Employment Law” (1981) 31:2 
UTLJ 200 at 202. 
19 Brian Langille, “Labour Policy in Canada:  New Platform, New Paradigm” 




between the interests of all those who are involved in the employment 
relationship, keeping in mind the inequality in bargaining power that exists 
between an employer and an employee. 
As a final note for this discussion of the legal regulation of the 
employment relationship, while easily observable by any working person in 
21st Century Canada, it is important to note that with every passing day, 
more and more of Canada’s workforce is using computers and technology to 
accomplish its goals.  As a result, there have recently been many new 
employment issues that have arisen as a result of this spike in technological 
use and work.  Such issues will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6. 
2.2  SOCIALIZING AND PRIVACY 
 While a person’s working life does define a major part of an 
individual’s sense of identity, there is also much more to a person’s identity 
than the job he or she has.  A person’s job alone does not make up a person’s 
identity, or account completely for an individual’s sense of fulfullment.  A 
major part of being a living human on earth is interacting with other living 
humans – human beings are social animals.  The degree to which we interact 
with others varies, and the level of intimacy in those relationships between 
humans also varies; however, the likelihood of there being a person living in 
our society who did not interact with anyone, and did not have any kind of 




and relationships work to shape the course of an individual’s life, either 
directly or indirectly. 
Despite our desire to socialize, we often hear people claim that 
something is a “violation of their privacy,” or that they “just need some 
privacy.”  This is because something else human beings value is our privacy – 
but what exactly is privacy?  The Oxford English Dictionary defines “privacy” 
as follows: “The state or condition of being alone, undisturbed, or free from 
public attention, as a matter of choice or right; seclusion; freedom from 
interference or intrusion.”20  While this definition is a pretty good one, it does 
not explain the essence of the importance of privacy, or the extent to which 
we should have a right to privacy.  Furthermore, this definition of privacy, 
“the state or condition of being alone,” seems to be at odds with the other 
fundamental human desire to socialize.  A person’s right to privacy has been 
given countless different legal interpretations and meanings, varying in scope 
depending on the context in which a privacy issue arises, and the legislation 
that may apply to that situation.  Under Canada’s legal system, the degree to 
which an individual can reasonably expect privacy varies significantly 
depending where he or she is, whom he or she is with, and what he or she is 
doing – context is everything.  This emphasis on context shows that privacy is 
not only about an individual’s ability to be left alone. 
                                                
20 The Oxford English Dictionary, 2d ed, sub verbo “privacy”, online: Oxford 




In the article, Virtual Communities and the Social Dimension of Privacy, 
Janis Goldie has written that privacy is not only about the individual, but 
rather, there is a very important social dimension to privacy, where  “the 
other” plays an integral role in how the individual conceptualizes privacy:  
[looking at privacy on an individual level], privacy is seen as 
protecting the autonomy of the individual, the desired intimacy 
level for each individual, and the individual's right to choose and 
act in various social roles. However, there is always an implicit 
reference to "the other" when discussing privacy. Autonomy is 
inherently about autonomy from others, intimacy is about intimate 
relations between oneself and others, and the social roles one 
chooses to enact are for other people. Furthermore, the degree of 
accessibility to others and the amount of information one wants 
others to have are all connected to privacy. In this way, privacy is 
essentially a social concept --at its very core, privacy has to do with 
our relations with others. Privacy is about facilitating associations 
with people, not about creating independence from people.21 
 
What this implies is that “the other” is key to how individuals determine the 
degree to which they want privacy.  This is to say that privacy is really about 
having the ability to choose with whom, and to what extent, we let others into 
our lives. 
 Furthermore, it is not only only the individual, but society as a whole 
that benefits from the legal recognition of an individual’s right to privacy.  In 
Canada, we have a constitutional right to be secure from unreasonable search 
                                                
21 Janis L Goldie, “Virtual Communities and the Social Dimension of Privacy” 
(2006) 3:1 UOLTJ 133 at paragraph 18 [Virtual Communities and the Social 




and seizure by state actors.22  In conceptualizing this right, the Supreme 
Court of Canada has explicitly acknowledged that “the restraints imposed on 
government to pry into the lives of the citizen go to the essence of a 
democratic state.”23  If the government does not have any restraints on the 
degree to which it can pry into the lives of citizens, freedoms essential to the 
democratic process, like freedom of speech and freedom of association, can be 
significantly reduced, and perhaps rendered meaningless.24 Without such 
freedoms, the extent to which we are able to organically progress in a manner 
that is reflective of the true wishes of citizens is stifled.   
The societal interest in privacy does not only pertain to privacy from 
an unfettered watch by the state, but also from other private actors.  If we 
feel that other citizens are constantly able to unwelcomely observe us, we will 
feel that we are constantly subject to the threat of unsolicited judgment, 
correction, and criticism;25 we would essentially be reduced to living our lives 
like children, fearful that any of our actions could be brought back in the 
future and used against us.  Our individuality will be suppressed if 
everything we do in our personal lives is observed and recorded by 
                                                
22 See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, R.S.C, 1985 Appendix II, 
No. 44 s. 8 see also Part I (ss. 1 to 34) of the Constitution Act, 1982. 
23 R v Tessling, 2004 SCC 67, [2004] 3 SCR 432, 244 DLR (4th) 541 at 
paragraph 3 [Tessling]. 
24 Priscilla Regan, Legislating Privacy: Technology, Social Values, and Public 
Policy (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1995) at 221-
230. 
25 I say unsolicited criticism here, because I am not including certain 





unwelcome audiences.  The result of such a society would be one where 
creativity is suppressed, uniqueness is not appreciated, and as a result, 
human progress is stymied. 
 A common retort to those who advocate for privacy is that, ‘if you are 
not doing anything wrong, then what do you have to hide?’  The problem with 
such an idea is that it presumes that privacy is about hiding something 
wrong.  We are not doing something wrong when we go to the bathroom, or 
when we seek out a secluded place to have an intimate conversation.  We are 
not doing anything wrong when we write a personal journal, or write a letter 
to a friend.  We seek out different degrees of privacy when we do these things, 
essentially, because they are exclusively our business.  If we are not able to 
find a private place to use the bathroom, we may not go until it is absolutely 
necessary.  If we cannot find a private place to have an intimate 
conversation, we may forgo the conversation completely.  And if we know that 
our personal journal or personal correspondence is free for all others to read, 
then the content of what we write in that journal or correspondence will be 
altered significantly, or we may not write such a journal or correspondence at 
all.  The idea is that if we do not have privacy, our demeanor changes 
regardless of whether we are doing something that is socially acceptable.  
Our actions are filtered, and our individuality is suppressed.  Privacy is about 
having the ability to reasonably choose our audience, or to reasonably choose 




 In addition to the aforementioned constitutional protection of privacy 
in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the common law has evolved to 
recognize the tort of “intrusion upon seclusion,”26 and numerous federal and 
provincial statutes have been enacted with the purpose of protecting the 
privacy rights of individuals.  These legal privacy protections will be 
examined in further detail in Chapter 4. 
The degree of privacy control we have in our social interactions and 
relationships with other people not only works to shape one’s life externally, 
they also shape a person’s sense of identity.  It is for this reason the real 
value of privacy is to allow people to choose their audience – not to simply be 
left alone.  Relationships and social interactions serve to play a determinative 
role in a person’s life that is constitutive of their personhood by virtue of the 
“inherently social nature of human beings.”27   
Françoise Baylis’s article, The Self in Situ: A Relational Account of 
Personal Identity28 uses relational theory to unpack how individuals 
conceptualize their personal identity.  Key to relational theory is that 
individuals are not wholly autonomous beings, but rather, 
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and Jennifer Llewellyn, eds, Being Relational: Reflections on Relational 
Theory in Health Law (Vancouver: UNC Press, 2012) at 4 [Being Relational] 
quoting Jennifer Nedelsky, “Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts, and 
Possibilities” (1989) 7 Yale JL & Feminism 7 at 8. 
28 Françoise Baylis, “The Self in Situ: A Relational Account of Personal 
Identity” in Being Relational: Reflections on Relational Theory in Health Law 




No one is fully independent … the view of individuals as 
isolated social units is not only false but impoverished: much 
of who we are and what we value is rooted in our relationships 
and affinities with others ... all persons are, to a significant 
degree, socially constructed … their identities, values, 
conceptions, and perceptions are, in large measure, products 
of their social environment.29 
 
According to Baylis, an individual’s identity is an amalgam of self-ascription 
and ascription by others.30   
It is through our (more or less conscious) interpretations of 
our values, memories, actions, experiences, and so on as well 
as the (more or less conscious) interpretations of these same 
characteristics by others that we come to embody answers to 
these pivotal questions, thereby instantiating our place in the 
world as we continually strive for balance between how we see 
and understand ourselves and how others see and understand 
us.31 
 
When there is a balance between our own conception of ourselves and that 
which others ascribe to us, there is a state of identity ‘Equilibrium;’ meaning 
that the points upon which there is inner and outer congruency are 
considered to be identity-defining.  
We are all complex interdependent beings whose identity is 
co-constructed and maintained through iterative and cyclical 
private and public actions, reactions, interactions, and 
transactions.  As we live our lives, constrained in ever-
changing ways by our social, cultural, and political 
environments, as well as by our historical circumstances, we 
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PA: Temple University Press, 1998) 19 at 34-35. 
30 Baylis, The Self in Situ, supra at note 28, 118. 




communicate in overt and covert ways who we are, and we 
imagine, hope, and despair that others will come to see and 
understand us as we see and understand ourselves.  When 
this happens (that is, when there is a congruence between 
self-ascriptions and ascriptions by others), our identity 
temporarily stabilizes until such time as there is a shift in our 
identity-constituting self-narrative and we enter a period of 
disequilibrium, looking once again to restore the balance 
between how we see and understand ourselves and how others 
see and understand us.  So it is that we are who we say we are 
and who others will let us be.32 
 
It appears that in addition to social activity giving us our own ideas about 
who we think we are, we socialize with others to get a sense of who others 
think we are, searching for an ‘equilibrium’ between the way others see us 
and understand us and how we see and understand ourselves.  Privacy, 
conceptualized as the ability to choose our audience, allows individuals to 
pursue ‘equilibrium’ in such a way that they can feel a sense of control and 
security over how they go about defining their own identity.  They can feel 
secure that the parts of their lives that they reasonably wish to stay private 
can remain private, and the extent and audience for the elements of their life 
they wish to share with others is also under their control.  What privacy 
allows us to do as individuals is live and contour our lives on this earth 
together with the relational autonomy necessary for us to achieve a real 
sense of personhood and identity. 
2.3   SOCIALIZING VIA TECHNOLOGY 
                                                




 With the advancement of technology, people are becoming ever more 
‘connected’ with one another.  I put ‘connected’ in quotations because I do not 
necessarily mean that people are seeing more of each other’s physical bodies, 
or interacting more in a physical way, but it is becoming easier and more 
convenient for people to socialize with one another.  This allows more 
opportunity for individuals to put forth what they believe to be their identity-
defining values and features in an effort to achieve identity equilibrium. 
Websites that have the effect of making this process easier and more 
instantaneous are what are known as “Social Networking” sites.  I will 
explore in greater detail the inner-workings of social networking sites, 
specifically Facebook, in Chapter 3.  What these sites allow individuals to do 
is interact and socialize with one another online.  The type of activity that 
occurs on these sites is more nuanced than e-mail, in that there are many 
differing levels of interaction, as well as a wide variety of multi-media that 
can be shared with other people.  Part of what makes these sites popular is 
not just the ease with which they allow people to keep in touch with one 
another, but sites like Facebook offer a favourable avenue for people to more 
easily express what they believe to be their “true self,” that may not be so 
easily expressed in face-to-face-communications.33  This allows for individuals 
to put out a narrative of what they believe to be the characteristics that truly 
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define them; the nature of the site makes what the individual puts out 
observable by others, thus creating a medium through which equilibrium can 
be assessed and achieved, and, in turn, true, relational identity can be 
formed.  Furthermore, the nature of the way in which people use these sites 
(navigating in the cyber world as opposed to face-to-face interactions) allows 
for people to escape the shackles of shyness on a physical level that may, in 
the physical world, hinder people from showing their true ‘self’ that they wish 
for their intended audience to see. 
The trickiness with the use of electronic technology and social 
networking for socializing is that this new way in which we interact causes 
there to be a record of all of our personal interactions that occur on these 
sites.  Without adequate legal protection and regulation, the existence of such 
a record can have serious implications for the erosion of personal privacy.  
More and more, online Facebook activity is trickling its way into offline 
contexts, perhaps none more so than the employment context.  There is an 
emerging practice of employers performing what are known as ‘social media 
background checks,’ on potential employees, and even going so far as to ask 
for a candidate’s social networking login information (meaning not just their 
login name, but their personal password);34 not only this, but Facebook 
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activity and postings have been found to be sufficient grounds for discipline 
and termination of the employment relationship.35  This is major! 
As mentioned above, there exists legislation and case law that protect 
personal privacy, and employment standards legislation that protect the 
interests of employers and employees, but these laws are slow to evolve, 
whereas technology is evolving at a very rapid pace.  While the law can do 
little to stop the progression of technology, the law can do much to protect the 
important and valuable aspects of personal interaction with technology.  If 
Facebook and other social networking sites are going to have any real, 
substantial value in today’s world, people need to be comfortable using the 
sites, and trusting of their inner workings.  What is needed are laws that 
take into account the complicated dynamics of the employment relationship 
and serve to protect privacy in light of the rapid technological changes and 
they way these changes are affecting societal norms and the new 
technological mediums people are using to socialize with one another.  
Protection of privacy in this context needs to be re-conceptualized and 
ramped up; if it is not, and the law allows employers to pry into the personal 
online affairs of employees, work concerns will hang over the employees’ 
heads and the potential that virtual space presents for personal fulfillment 
through online social activity is compromised. 
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An emerging approach to the re-conceptualization of how the law 
should approach online privacy is what is called “New Virtualism.”  New 
Virtualism will be explained in greater detail in Chapter 7.  The key aspects 
of New Virtualism are a perspective that recognizes and acknowledges the 
distinct nature of virtual space and how people live and interact within that 
space, and the rejection of the categorization of privacy protection of an 
individual’s online activity as “informational privacy” in favour of an 
approach to privacy protection that is more firmly and appropriately based on 




CHAPTER 3 Social Networking Explained 
Before getting into the details of specific legislation and case law that 
pertains to social networking and employment law, I will first explain what 
exactly social networking sites are, and drawing on the most popular social 
networking site, Facebook, the nature of their use. 
3.1  SOCIAL NETWORKING 
 Social Media services are online applications that serve as forums and 
gathering places in which people can interact, socialize, and share user-
generated content with one another.  Social Media has been defined as “a 
group of internet-based applications that build on the ideological and 
technological foundations of web 2.036 and that allow the creation and 
exchange of user-generated content.”37  There are six different types of social 
media: [1] collaborative projects (Wikipedia); [2] blogs and microblogs, 
(blogspot, Twitter)38; [3] content communities (YouTube); [4] social 
networking sites (Facebook, LinkedIn); [5] virtual game worlds (World of 
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37 Andreas Kaplan, Michael Haenlein, “Users of the World, Unite! The 
Challenges and Opportunities of Social Media”, (2010) Business Horizons 
53(1) at 59 [Users of the World, Unite!].  
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social networking site.  For example, while Twitter can be a microblog, where 
people blog their thoughts on issues or provide hyperlinks in 140 character-
or-less “tweets,” some people also use twitter exclusively as a forum for social 




Warcraft); [6] virtual social worlds (Second Life).39  This work will focus on 
social networking sites.  I have chosen social networking because of the 
inherently personal nature of a social networking account, as well as 
employer practices with respect to social networking monitoring, which will 
be discussed in greater detail in Chapters 5 and 6. 
 Social networks are websites or web-based services that “allow users to 
(1) construct a public or semi-public profile within a bounded system, (2) 
articulate a list of others with whom they share a connection, and (3) view 
and traverse their list of connections and those made by others within the 
system.”40  Facebook is a social networking site owned by Facebook, Inc. that 
launched in 2004.  In 2009, Facebook became the most widely-used social 
networking site in the world.41  As of April, 2012, Facebook had over 900 
million monthly users, and 526 million users who login to Facebook on a daily 
basis.42  Facebook’s mission statement is “to give people the power to share 
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and Scholarship, (2008) Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication 13, 
210-230 at 211 [Social Network Sites: Definition, History, and Scholarship]. 
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Climbs” CompetePulse (9 February 2009) online: 
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and make the world more open and connected.”43  On Facebook’s homepage, it 
is written that Facebook is “free and always will be.”44  Because it is the most 
used and elaborate of all social network sites, Facebook will be the social 
network of choice for explanation and application in this work. 
3.2  FACEBOOK BACKGROUND 
 In 2004, Mark Zuckerberg, who was at the time a Harvard 
undergraduate student, launched Facebook.  Each freshman at Harvard was 
given a hard-copy photo album of all incoming students; Zuckerberg’s site, 
then called thefacebook.com, was an online version of this book designed to be 
used by all students at Harvard.45  Soon afterwards, the site spread to other 
universities - Columbia and Stanford.46  Facebook was much like other social 
media sites that existed at the time; however, its distinctive feature was its 
exclusivity, in that it was only available to people who had email addresses at 
certain universities, and as a result those users could participate in school 
specific networks.47  In 2005, Facebook was opened up to high school 
students, and in 2006, to anyone with an email address.48 
                                                
43 Facebook “Mission Statement” online: 
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45 Ilana Gershon, “Un-Friend My Heart: Facebook, Promiscuity, and 
Heartbreak in a Neoliberal Age” (2011) 84 Anthropological Quarterly 865 at 
871 [Un-Friend My Heart].  
46 Gershon, Un-Friend My Heart ibid. 
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3.3  TECHNICAL USE 
 Answers to most technical questions about Facebook can be found by 
navigating Facebook’s Help Center.49  I will, however, give an overview of 
Facebook’s most commonly used features.  When signing up for Facebook, the 
only information that is required is one’s first name, last name, email 
address, sex, birthday (including date, month, and year), and a password.  
The only information that requires any form of confirmation is your email 
address.50  Beyond this information, all information that is provided to and 
posted on Facebook is at the discretion of the user.  This leaves open the 
possibility for the creation of fake accounts (an issue to be discussed later). 
3.3.1  USER PROFILE 
 Facebook begins with a user ‘Profile.’  Profiles are unique pages where 
one can “type oneself into being.”51  The profile is where other Facebook users 
look to find information about a Facebook user.  Beyond stating the name of 
the user, all Facebook profiles have what is called a ‘Profile Picture.’  
Facebook provides a default silhouette photo, but almost all users replace 
this photo with one of their choosing.  On each person’s profile page, a small 
version of one profile picture (chosen by the user) is displayed, but if a user 
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clicks on the picture, a bigger, clearer version of the picture (and past profile 
pictures) is accessible.  In addition to the user’s name and profile picture, 
every profile has certain ‘tabs.’  Tabs are categorizations of information that 
is contained in a user profile.  I will now describe each of these tabs. 
3.3.1.1  INFO 
 As can be inferred from the title of this tab, this is where information 
about the user can be found.  Such information can include (but is not limited 
to) the following52:  sex, relationship status (including specifics of the 
relationship i.e. the identity of significant other), employer and job status, 
religion, education, “people who inspire me”, favourite quotations, favourite 
TV shows, favourite books, favourite movies, sports I play, favourite sports 
teams, favourite athletes, activities and interests, email address, phone 
number, address, hometown, current city, and languages spoken.  In addition 
to this, there is a slot titled “about me,” where a user can write something 
about himself or herself that is not captured by the other categories. 
3.3.1.1  NOTES 
 Notes is a tab that allows a facebook user to write a note.  This is akin 
to a ‘blog,’ in that it is a space where someone can write whatever they wish 
for people to read. 
                                                





3.3.1.1  PHOTOS 
 The Photos tab is exactly what it sounds like it would be.  Under this 
tab are pictures associated with this user profile.  Users can upload pictures 
to their profile by creating what is called an “album.”  Albums are given a 
title, and each photo in the album has a space for the uploading user to write 
a caption for the specific photo.  The time and date that the picture is 
uploaded is also displayed with every picture.53 
 Photos can also be uploaded to a user’s profile through the use of the 
“tagging” feature.  I will explore this feature in more detail below. 
3.3.1.1  FRIENDS 
 The Friends tab displays all of a user’s “friends” on Facebook.  People 
become friends in the following way.  User X comes across user Y’s profile.  At 
the top of user Y’s profile is an “add friend” button.  If user X clicks that 
button, a friend request will be sent to user Y.  User Y then has the option to 
‘confirm’ or ‘ignore’ user X’s request.  If user Y confirms, then they become 
friends; if user Y ignores, they do not become friends.  The Friends tab will 
show all of a user’s friends.  Under this tab there is also an option for 
“family,” which shows which users you are related to, and the specific nature 
of that familial relation. 
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 Under the friends tab there is also a clustering of that user’s friends 
who you share as “mutual friends.”  These are users who are friends with 
both you and that user. 
3.3.1.1  WALL 
 The wall is a virtual whiteboard where the user and the user’s friends 
can post messages.  Wall posts indicate the author of the message by 
displaying the user’s name54 next to the post.  It also includes the date and 
time the author posted the message.  Wall posts can be in the form of text, 
hyperlink, or a photo.  Wall posts are time-stamped. 
3.3.2  STATUS UPDATE 
 In the status update bar is the following question:  “What’s on your 
mind?”  This is where users can write what is similar to a wall post; however, 
it is posted onto your own wall.  Status updates can be in the form of text, 
hyperlink, a photo, or a video.  Status updates are also time-stamped. 
3.3.3  TAGGING 
 Tagging a user in something adds that user’s name to a post in the 
form of a hyperlink, in that it can be clicked and the clicker can be brought 
directly to user’s profile.  Users can be tagged in notes, wall posts, status 
                                                





updates, photos, and videos.  When a user is tagged in something, not only 
does their name appear in that post, but the post also appears on the person’s 
profile.  When a user is tagged in a photo, not only does the user’s name 
appear in hyperlink form with the photo, but when the cursor hovers over the 
tagged user name, an indication appears on the photo itself identifying who 
the tagged user is. 
 Another form of tagging is what is known as “checking in.”  A user can 
write a status update about where they are, and can tag the location.  This 
can be done using GPS from a mobile phone, or the location will have its own 
Facebook page that can be tagged into the post. 
3.3.4  NEWS FEED 
 In 2006, Facebook launched the “News Feed.”55  When a user logs into 
Facebook, they are immediately brought to his or her news feed.  As the 
Facebook homepage, the news feed operates as a type of news ticker that 
instantly informs the user of any of his or her friends’ activity.  For example, 
if a friend changes his or her profile picture, writes a status update, or posts a 
photo album, this activity will show up in the news feed.  Only the activity of 
a user’s friends shows up in the user’s news feed.  User friends’ birthdays are 
also displayed on the Facebook homepage beside the news feed.  It is possible 
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for users to customize their news feed in such a way that updates about 
certain friends do not show up in the news feed. 
3.3.5  MESSAGES 
 Besides wall posts, Facebook users can communicate with one another in a more 
private forum – messages.  Messages are akin to emails in that they are sent from one 
user to another user, and are only accessible in the users’ inboxes.  Messages can be 
between two users, or many users.  Each Facebook user has a “Messages” tab on the 
Facebook site that is accessible only by the user.  Each correspondence between users 
shows up in a “thread” detailing the history of the correspondence.  For example, if user 
X and user Y have an ongoing correspondence, either user, under their messages tab, 
would have a history of their correspondence treated as one correspondence.  Only those 
two could access the correspondence.  However, if user X and user Y and user Z had a 
message correspondence between the three of them, it would be treated as a 
correspondence separate from user X and user Y’s correspondence, and all three users 
could access the history of the correspondence between users X, Y, and Z.  All messages 
are time-stamped. 
3.3.6  COMMENTING 
 Another way people communicate is by commenting on other user’s (or the user’s 
own) activity.  Whether it is a photo, status update, note, or wall post, a user’s friend can 




itself, and are viewable not only by the user who posted the note, but also that user’s 
friends.  All comments are time-stamped. 
3.3.7  THE “LIKE” BUTTON 
 Like comments, users can “Like” other users’ posts.  For example, if user X 
posted something (a photo, status update, wall post, etc.), and user Y clicked the “Like” 
button below the post, then a message below the post that says “user Y likes this” will 
appear below the post.  All who can see the post can see who liked the post.  Likes are 
not time-stamped, but they would have to have happened after the post itself, which is 
time-stamped.  While the wording of “liking” implies that the clicking user liked the 
activity, this is not always the case and because it is a type of electronic ‘rubber stamp’ 
that cannot be altered, what is meant by a “like” can vary depending on the 
circumstances. 
3.3.8  CHAT 
 Another forum/form of communication between users is through Facebook chat.  
When a user is logged into Facebook on a computer, there is an application called chat, 
where the user can see what other users are “online”56 and the user’s can engage in 
instant messaging.  A log of the chat history is kept in the messages tab as a form of 
message correspondence between the users.  All messages sent are time-stamped.  Users 
can select to not appear “online” in chat, despite being logged into Facebook. 
                                                




 In the chat application there is also the option to have a video chat, using your 
computer’s webcam.  Such conversations are not logged into the correspondence thread 
under the messages tab. 
3.3.9  EVENTS 
 Events are pages that are created for future events that are happening, either 
online or in the physical world.  Event pages are much like user profiles in that they have 
a wall, information tab, and photos.  Users create the event page, give the event a title, 
and provide the time, date, place, picture, and a description.  Users are then invited to the 
event and can RSVP by clicking either “Attending,” “Not Attending,” or “Maybe.”  It is 
then displayed on the event page itself who is attending, who is not, and who is a 
“maybe.”  If a user is attending an event, a notification will show up on the user’s profile, 
and in the user’s friends’ news feed. 
3.3.10 GROUPS 
 Groups, like events, are created by Facebook users and have their own page.  
Facebook groups, like social groups, can be about pretty much anything – from fans of a 
certain TV show to members of a bridge club to cycling enthusiasts in Halifax.  In the 
group, members can make wall posts, create discussion topics, and post pictures and 
videos.  Groups are places for people with similar interests to congregate to discuss a 





 Pages are similar to profiles, but they often represent a certain cause.  Many 
businesses, organizations, celebrities, and social causes have their own Facebook page.  
Like groups, there can be a page for almost anything.  A page is like a profile, in that it 
looks essentially the same as a profile, only pages do not have friends.  Pages post 
updates for people to see.  To have these updates show up in your News Feed, a user is to 
“like” the page, much the same way they “like” a post by a friend.  It is displayed on each 
page how many people “like” the page, much like on user’s profiles where it displays 
who a user’s friends are.  When a user likes a page, not only do they subscribe to the 
page’s updates, but a notification of this “like” shows up on the user’s profile and the 
news feeds of the user’s friends.  When one creates a Page, he or she is agreeing to the 
possibility of his or her Page being “liked” by anyone – there is no confirmation process 
as there is for a friend request. 
3.3.12 SEARCH BAR 
 At the top of every page of Facebook is a toolbar.  On this toolbar there is a 
search bar where a user can search for friends, users who are not friends, groups, pages, 
events, etc.  There are also other parts of Facebook (profile, messages, newsfeed etc.) that 
are accessible through the toolbar, but the search bar is located only on the toolbar at the 





 On each user’s profile there is an option to “poke” the user.  When one user pokes 
another, the user who was poked receives a notification of the poke, and who it is from.  
Much like a “like,” it is not known what exactly a poke means. 
3.3.14 NOTIFICATIONS 
 When a Facebook user does something on Facebook that involves you, 
you receive what is called a “notification.”  There will be a notice on the site 
telling you what happened, whether it is a wall post, a photo tag, a friend 
request, or when someone “likes” or comments on one of your posts.  There is 
also an option to receive notifications via email or text message to a user’s 
phone.  Notifications are received instantly when the activity occurs, and are 
time-stamped. 
3.3.15 TIMELINE 
 Recently, Facebook profiles, while keeping the same features, have 
been reorganized into what is known as a “Timeline.”  Content on a regular 
profile appears in sequential order, starting with the most recent.  Under this 
set-up, to view a user’s activity from months or years ago, depending on the 
frequency of that user’s activity, it was necessary to scroll through a lot of 
information in search of something in particular.  With timeline, all activity 
is organized along a clickable timeline, allowing viewers to click back to a 
certain year or month in search of activity.  Something new that comes along 




of banner that sits at the top of a user’s Profile.  The user does not need to 
have a Cover Photo, but should he or she choose to, he or she can upload any 
picture he or she wishes as his or her Cover Photo. 
3.3.16 SEE FRIENDSHIP 
 Below an interaction between two users is a “see friendship” link.  
Clicking this link brings the viewer to a page that details the interactions 
between the two users, as well as any mutual events, groups, tagged photos, 
etc. that those two users share.  
3.3.17 FACEBOOK MOBILE 
 Virtually all that can be done via the Facebook website can also be 
done via Mobile application on a smartphone. 
3.4  PERSONAL INFORMATION 
 What all of these Facebook features and applications add up to is a 
record of the user’s activity, and given the plethora of ways in which users 
can interact and share on Facebook, to track the user’s activity can reveal 
some of the most intimate details of a person’s life.  George Washington 
University law professor Orin Kerr has said that asking for access to 




house keys.”57  I submit that the information that a person can potentially 
access logging into another’s Facebook account is even more invasive than 
entering the person’s home.  All the information is filed, organized, and can 
be easily navigated by those who know where to look – it can provide a 
complete digital mapping of the user’s life both in the form of black and white 
text, as well as digital photos. The information that can be found out can 
pertain to, but is not limited to, personal preferences, religious beliefs, 
relationships, interests, personal correspondences, health, hobbies, 
employment information (and the list can go on); essentially, it can reveal 
some of the most intimate aspects of an individual’s life.  Daniel Solove has 
written the following about the collection of personal digital information: 
Digital technology enables the preservation of the minutia of 
our everyday comings and goings, of our likes and dislikes, of 
who we are and what we own.  It is ever more possible to 
create an electronic collage that covers much of a person’s life 
– a life captured in records, a digital person composed in the 
collective computer networks of the world.58 
 
With this in mind, Facebook allows its users to select their own privacy 
settings for their online activity. 
3.5  FACEBOOK PRIVACY 
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 Mark Zuckerberg has been quoted as saying that “the problem 
Facebook is solving is this one paradox…People want access to all the 
information around them, but they also want control of their own 
information.  Those two things are at odds with each other.  Technologically, 
we could put all the information out there for everyone to see, but people 
wouldn’t want that because they want to control their information.”59  As a 
result of this paradox, the privacy settings for a user’s content are, for the 
most part, under the control of the user.  Not just in the sense that the user is 
the generator of the activity, but also in the sense that Facebook allows the 
user to configure who can see the content they put on Facebook.  It is 
unequivocally stated in Facebook’s Principles60, Data Use Policy61, and 
Statement of Rights and Responsibilities62 that the Facebook user owns their 
own information; however, it is also acknowledged that Facebook does use 
this information for their own purposes (i.e. advertising, troubleshooting, to 
make suggestions to users, etc.).  Each type of Facebook interaction can have 
different privacy settings.  For example, your status updates can have one 
privacy setting, and your tagged photos can have a different privacy setting.  
There are a few default privacy setting that Facebook suggests to a user. 
                                                
59 Gershon, Un-Friend My Heart supra at note 45. 
60 Facebook “Principles” online: <http://www.facebook.com/principles.php>.  
61 Facebook “Data Use Policy” online:  
<http://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/>.  





  3.5.1  PUBLIC 
 Under this setting, all activity is viewable by anyone on Facebook, and 
your profile page and its contents are even accessible to anyone with access to 
a web browsing service, regardless of whether he or she is a Facebook 
member or your friend.  This is the least private privacy setting on the site; 
rather, it could be more appropriately characterized as a “lack of privacy” 
setting, as it makes your Facebook activity available to everyone.  Currently, 
the only aspect of Facebook that has to remain completely public is a user’s 
Cover Photo, should the user choose to have one. 
  3.5.3  FRIENDS AND NETWORK 
 This allows your content to be viewed by your friends, as well as 
anyone who is a member of your “Network.”  A Network is some kind of 
community, often a town or school, to which people belong.  Under this 
setting, all of your friends, and all Facebook members of that network can 
view your content. 
  3.5.3  FRIENDS AND FRIENDS OF FRIENDS 
 This allows your content to be viewed by your friends, as well as 
anyone who is a friend of one of your friends. 




 This setting makes your content viewable to only your friends. 
  3.5.4  CUSTOM 
 This setting is, as the name would suggest, customizable.  This is 
potentially the most private setting possible.  The least private a custom 
setting can be is that the content is viewable by friends, friends of friends, 
and those users in your network.  However, it is possible to customize the 
privacy settings in your content so that it is only viewable by certain 
groupings of friends, or perhaps viewable by all friends except a certain few, 
or even viewable by only you, the user of the account.  The custom privacy 
settings allow a user to contour which Facebook users can view what content, 
and to what extent.  It is the most elaborate privacy setting possible.  To 
illustrate, while it would defeat the interactional purpose of Facebook, under 
the custom setting, it is possible to make all of your content viewable only by 
yourself and either the author of the post, or the person who is on the 
receiving end of anything you post (i.e. a wall post). 
 Users have their default settings made to whatever setting they 
choose; however, there is a clickable option beside each post that is known as 
the “audience selector.”  The audience selector is a dropdown box that allows 
the user to select privacy settings for each item he or she posts, thus making 
the privacy settings for every single post he or she makes customizable before 




onto Facebook, there are varying degrees of expectations with respect to the 
coded privacy that protects the specific content and its accessibility to other 
Facebook users. 
 Also, it is possible to block another Facebook user.  Doing this makes it 
so that user cannot see any of your Facebook activity and you cannot see any 
of his or her activity.  From that user’s perspective, it is as if you are not on 
Facebook. 
3.6  ACTIVITY LOG 
 From a user’s profile, there is a clickable “Activity Log” that details all 
of a user’s Facebook activity that is viewable by others on Facebook.  Here, 
there will be a time stamped timeline of any new friendships, comments, 
uploads, “likes,” etc.  It also shows who the possible audience for the 
particular activity is based on the receiving user’s privacy settings. 
3.7  FAKE ACCOUNTS AND LOGIN INFORMATION SHARING 
 Given how easily a Facebook page can be created, and how easily login 
information can be shared between individuals, Facebook’s Statement of 
Rights and Responsibilities explicitly prohibits the practices of creating fake 
accounts and sharing your login information.  Section 4(1) stipulates that 
“You will not provide any false personal information on Facebook, or create 




stipulates that “You will not solicit login information or access an account 
belonging to someone else.”  Section 4 (1) stipulates that “You will not share 
your password…let anyone else access your account, or do anything else that 
might jeopardize the security of your account.”  These parts of the Statement 
of Rights and Responsibilities serve to provide some solace to Facebook users 
in that they can feel comfortable that the content he or she posts on the site 
is, at least according to the Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, 
viewable only by those users whom they have deemed to have access to his or 
her posts. 
 With that said, it is still very possible and simple to create a fake 
Facebook account.  In fact, Facebook recently reported in a form 10-Q filing 
with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission that there are 
83 million fake Facebook accounts.63  According to the report, those 83 million 
accounts make up 8.7% of total accounts on Facebook; of that 8.7%, 4.8% are 
duplicate accounts, 2.4% are user-misclassified accounts, and 1.5% are 
spam.64  Furthermore, while the aforementioned agreements between 
Facebook and its users prevent login information sharing, the reality is that 
                                                
63 Todd Wasserman, “83 Million Facebook Accounts Are Fake” Mashable 
Social Media (2 August 2012) online: <http://mashable.com/2012/08/02/fake-








it is extremely easy for individuals to pass along their login information to 
others, allowing multiple people to have access to a single Facebook account. 
3.8  USE OF FACEBOOK 
 How exactly a particular user uses his or her Facebook account 
depends on the user.  One way that Facebook can be used is simply to keep in 
touch with friends.  It has advantages in this regard that are not available 
via email, in that people can keep in touch in various degrees.  Unlike email, 
where one can only send messages (with attachments, hyperlinks, other 
media), on Facebook, the medium (i.e. private message, wall post, comment, 
“like,” etc.) is part of the message.  In this regard, the way a Facebook 
account is used can be very nuanced depending on the relationship between 
the users.   
Something else unique that Facebook allows is for individuals to have 
a virtual space that they can shape both in content and audience in order to 
put out a clear picture, using a multitude of mediums, of who they believe 
themselves to be.  People can customize, alter, or change their Facebook page 
instantly depending on their own personal preferences.  This allows for 
individuals to present a sense of self in a very easy and convenient way – this 
is a major value of Facebook. 




 On the other side of the coin, something for which Facebook use is 
particularly notorious, is what has become known as “creeping.”  Creeping 
involves perusing through another user’s profile, including their pictures, 
wall posts, statuses, etc.  The subject of a user’s Facebook creeping may be 
the user’s friend, but depending on the subject’s privacy settings, he or she 
may not be the friend of the user who is creeping.  All Facebook users, by 
virtue of signing up for the service are openly inviting creeping to varying 
degrees, depending on their privacy settings.  Essentially, Facebook 
interaction and communication is not considered creeping, but simply looking 
through anyone’s Facebook profile is, and it is considered to be especially 
“creepy” to look through a person’s Facebook profile if he or she is not your 
friend.  Creeping is, for all intents and purposes, undetected monitoring of a 
user’s Facebook activity.  A vital aspect of Facebook that allows for creeping 
is that it in no way makes available the information or the extent to which 
one user views another user’s profile. 
3.10 PRIVACY COMMISSIONER ISSUES 
 Facebook has on more than one occasion been the subject of reviews by 
the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada.  The Office of the Privacy 
Commissioner of Canada has been investigating Facebook almost 
continuously since 2009.  It used to be such that not all elements of a user’s 




certain elements of a Facebook profile, regardless of whether they were a 
user’s Friend).  As a result, Privacy Commissioner Jennifer Stoddart has 
twice issued reports that have urged Facebook to ramp up users’ ability to 
control the privacy settings on more aspects of their Facebook account and 
make the language of user agreements and the ability to customize privacy 
settings more clear and user-friendly.65  It is important to note here that the 
aim of the Privacy Commissioner’s reports was to allow people more control 
in their ability to select their audience.  This is very much in keeping with 
the discussion of the meaning of privacy protection in Chapter 2 – privacy 
protection is not about being left alone, but rather about the ability of 
individuals to have a sense of control when it comes to choosing their 
audience for different parts of their lives.   
All Privacy Commissioner reports resulted in Facebook agreeing to 
take active steps with a view towards complying with the Privacy 
Commissioner’s requests.  While the specifics of these reports are not entirely 
pertinent to this work, the constant monitoring and alteration in the name of 
                                                
65 See the following news releases from the Office of the Privacy 
Commissioner of Canada:  “Facebook agrees to address Privacy 
Commissioner’s concerns” (27 August 2009 (online): 
<http://www.priv.gc.ca/media/nr-c/2009/nr-c_090827_e.asp>; ”Privacy 
Commissioner launches new Facebook probe” (27 January 2012) online: 
<http://www.priv.gc.ca/media/nr-c/2010/nr-c_100127_e.asp>; “Privacy 
Commissioner completes Facebook review” (22 September, 2012) online: 
<http://www.priv.gc.ca/media/nr-c/2010/nr-c_100922_e.asp>; “Privacy 
Commissioner: Facebook shows improvement in some areas, but should be 
more proactive on privacy when introducing new features” (4 April 2012) 




privacy protection demonstrates that the nature of the use of Facebook as a 
form of online socializing presents significant issues when it comes to the 




CHAPTER 4 The Current Landscape of Canadian Privacy 
Law 
 
 The primary mechanism for protection of individuals’ privacy interests 
is specific privacy legislation.  Given the inherent privacy issues that arise 
through the use of Facebook, the focus of this Chapter will be to examine the 
current landscape of privacy legislation in Canada.  In particular, this 
Chapter will outline the relevant provisions of certain pieces of Canadian 
privacy legislation that pertain to social networking information in the 
context of the employment relationship and examine where the legislation 
falls short.  Finally, this Chapter will explore the new Canadian tort of 
“intrusion upon seclusion.” 
Privacy legislation exists at both the federal and provincial levels, and 
there are different pieces of legislation regulating the public sector and the 
private sector.  The federal Privacy Act66 regulates any collection or use of 
personal information by the federal government and agencies of the federal 
government in the public sector.  There also exists in most provinces privacy 
legislation to regulate collection and use of personal information by the 
provincial government and agencies of the provincial government in the 
public sector.  The Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents 
Act [PIPEDA]67 is federal legislation that applies to every organization in 
respect of personal information that the organization collects, uses, or 
                                                
66 RSC 1985, c P-21 [Privacy Act]. 




discloses in the course of commercial activities; 68 – this is the privacy 
legislation that applies to the federally regulated private sector.  It also 
purports to apply to provincially regulated industries, but only with respect 
to a business’s commercial activities – not their employment relationships.69  
Some provinces have also enacted provincial private sector privacy statutes 
that regulate private institutions that fall under provincial jurisdiction – 
provinces are acknowledged under section 26(2)(b) of PIPEDA as having 
authority to enact legislation that the federal government agrees will replace 
PIPEDA, so long as that legislation is found to be substantially similar to 
PIPEDA.  This has been done in Alberta and British Columbia.  As such, 
there is a Memorandum of Understanding among The Office of the Privacy 
Commissioner of Canada, The Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Alberta, 
and the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of British Columbia with respect 
to cooperation and collaboration in private sector privacy policy, enforcement, 
and public education.70  This agreement is not a result of delegation from the 
federal to the provincial, but based on the assumption that both the federal 
                                                
68 PIPEDA, ibid at s 4(2)(a). 
69 The constitutionality of PIPEDA’s application to provincially regulated 
industries is a potentially contested issue.  The argument in favour of federal 
jurisdiction rests upon the Trade and Commerce power in s 91(2) of the 
Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, in light of trade dictates by the 
European Union. 
70 See Provincial and Territorial Privacy Commissioners and Ombuds Office, 





and provincial Offices have concurrent and overlapping jurisdiction in these 
matters.71 
While not the focus of this work, there also exist several federal and 
provincial sector-specific privacy laws.   
I will now examine the provisions of the aforementioned statutes that 
could apply to an individual’s social networking content in the context of the 
employment relationship. 
4.1  PRIVACY ACT 
 The Privacy Act is federal legislation that came into effect on July 1st, 
1983.  The Act sets out rules as to how the federal government must treat 
and handle the personal information of individuals.  “Personal Information” 
is defined, under the Act, as information about an identifiable individual 
recorded in any form, and the Act lists specific examples of what is included, 
without restricting the generality of the definition.72  The Act applies to 
federal government institutions, which, under the Act, are defined as (1) any 
department or ministry of state of the Government of Canada or any body or 
office located in the Act’s schedule, as well as (b) any parent Crown 
Corporation, and any wholly-owned subsidiary of such a corporation.73  The 
Act imposes limitations on what can be collected by a government institution, 
                                                
71 As mentioned supra at note 69, the propriety of federal jurisdiction is a 
contested issue. 
72 Privacy Act, supra at note 66, s 3. 




how it can be collected, and for what purposes.  Section 4 stipulates that no 
personal information shall be collected by a government institution unless it 
relates directly to an operating program or activity of the institution.74  
According to section 5 (1)(2), any information that is collected must, wherever 
possible, be collected directly from the individual and the individual must be 
made aware of the purpose(s) for which the information is being collected.75  
There are, however, exceptions to these requirements – if compliance may 
result in the collection of inaccurate information, or defeat the purpose or 
prejudice the use for which the information is collected, the requirements of 
section 5(1)(2) do not apply.76  The requirement of collection directly from the 
individual also does not apply if the individual authorizes an alternate form 
of collection.  Under the Act, every individual has the right to request and be 
given access to the personal information about the individual under the 
control of the government institution that is reasonably retrievable, and if 
the information is inaccurate, the individual has the right to request 
correction of any information that is not accurate.77  Any complaints under 
the Act are to be heard and investigated by the Privacy Commissioner of 
Canada.78 
                                                
74 Privacy Act, ibid at s 4. 
75 Privacy Act, ibid at s 5(1)(2). 
76 Privacy Act, ibid at s 5(3). 
77 Privacy Act, ibid at s 12. 




 What does this mean for an employer collecting the social networking 
information about a job candidate or an employee?  It means that if the 
employer is a federal government institution, it may only collect social 
networking information about a job candidate or employee if that information 
relates directly to an operating program or activity of that federal 
government institution.  This is fairly restrictive.  Not only this, but (with 
some limited exceptions) the individual must be made aware of the collection 
prior to the collection, must consent to the collection, and wherever possible, 
the institution must collect this information directly from the individual.  
4.2 PROVINCIAL PUBLIC SECTOR PRIVACY LEGISLATION 
 All provinces79 have enacted legislation that regulates the collection, 
use, and disclosure of personal information by provincial governments in the 
public sector.80  While not exactly uniform across jurisdictions, their standard 
for collection of information is essentially the same as in the Privacy Act – the 
                                                
79 An Act Respecting access to Documents Held by Public Bodies and the 
Protection of Personal Information, RSQ, c A-2.1; Freedom of Information and 
Protection of Privacy Act, SS 1990-91, c F-22.01; Freedom of Information and 
Protection of Privacy Act, RSA 2000, c F-25 [FIPPA AB]; Freedom of 
Information and Protection of Privacy Act, SNS 1993, c 5 at s 24(1) [FIPPA 
NS]; Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, RSBC 1996, c 
165; Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, RSO 1990, c F.31; 
The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, CCSM c F175; 
Right to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, SNB 2009, c R-10.6; 
Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, SNS 1993, c 5; 
Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, RSPEI 1988, c F-15.01; 
Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, SNL 2002, c A-1.1. 
80 Michael Power et al, “Access to Information and Privacy” Halsbury’s Laws 





collection of the information must relate directly to and be necessary for an 
operating program or activity of the public body.81  These pieces of legislation 
apply to public sector institutions under the authority of the provincial 
government, and they define personal information broadly, providing an 
illustrative and extensive list of what constitutes “personal information;” 
social networking information would certainly fall within the definition of 
personal information under all provincial Acts.82  Consent is required in all 
cases (with certain limited exceptions), though the form consent must take is 
not defined in the statutes of Manitoba, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, 
Newfoundland and Labrador, or Ontario.83  With certain exceptions, personal 
information is to be collected directly from the individual.84  Under all 
provincial Acts, there is an obligation on the institution to take steps to 
ensure the information is accurate.85 Standards similar to those in the 
Privacy Act exist under provincial privacy legislation for the use and 
disclosure of the information that was collected. 
 What this all amounts to is that there exist substantially similar levels 
and standards of privacy protection for the provincial public sector as there 
are for the federal public sector. 
                                                
81 See, for example, FIPPA AB, supra at note 79 at s 3, FIPPA NS, supra at 
note 79 at s 24(1). 
82 Access to Information and Privacy, supra at note 80, HAP-54. 
83 Access to Information and Privacy, ibid at HAP-53. 
84 Access to Information and Privacy, ibid at HAP-63; an exception to this is 
FIPPA NS, supra at note 79, which does not require direct collection. 




4.3 PERSONAL INFORMATION PROTECTION AND ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS 
ACT [PIPEDA] 
 PIPEDA is federal legislation that came into effect on April 13th, 2000.  
“Personal Information” is defined under PIPEDA as information about an 
identifiable individual, but does not include the name, title, or business 
address or telephone number of an employee of an organization.86  Social 
networking activity and information would certainly fall within this 
definition of personal information. 
The types of organizations and information that PIPEDA regulates are 
set out in section 4(1).  There is some trickiness to its application.  It states 
that PIPEDA applies to every organization in respect of personal information 
that it (a) uses, collects, or discloses in the course of commercial activities; or 
(b) is about an employee of the organization and that the organization uses, 
collects, or discloses in connection with the operation of a federal work, 
undertaking, or business.87  An “organization” is defined as including but not 
limited to an association, partnership, person or a trade union.88  It is 
explicitly stated PIPEDA does not apply to those organizations that fall 
under the purview of the Privacy Act – so it does not apply to any federal 
government institutions.89  “Commercial Activities” are defined as any 
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87 PIPEDA, ibid at s 4(1). 
88 PIPEDA, ibid at s 2. 




particular transaction, act, or conduct or any regular course of conduct that is 
commercial in character.90  “Employee” is not defined under s. 2.  Section 
27.1(3) states that “employee” is to include independent contractors, but it is 
also explicitly stated that this is for the purpose of s. 27.91  While they are not 
necessarily identical across the board, it can be assumed that for the 
purposes of the application of PIPEDA, employee is to be given a standard 
definition, similar to the ones that it is given in the common law and under 
employment standards legislation, or trade union or labour relations 
legislation.92  With respect to PIPEDA’s application to an employee, section 
4(1) means that if an organization is federally regulated (i.e. radio 
broadcasting, inter-provincial trade, a bank, etc.93), PIPEDA applies to 
employee information.  However, if an organization is not federally regulated, 
PIPEDA only applies to employee information that is used in a commercial 
way (i.e. selling the information to a marketing company).  This means that 
PIPEDA does not apply to employee information collected by organizations 
that are not federally regulated, so long as that information is not used in a 
commercial way.  To be clear, unless it is collected for some commercial 
                                                
90 PIPEDA, ibid at s 2. 
91 S 27’s purpose is to say that no employer shall dismiss, suspend, demote, 
discipline, harass or otherwise disadvantage an employee for complying with 
the provisions of PIPEDA.  As a result, this explicit definition does not apply 
in the context of an employee’s social networking information. 
92 The statutory definition of “employee” for employment standards 
legislation will be further explained in Chapter 5. 





purpose, social networking information collected about an employee by a 
private sector employee working in a provincially regulated industry is not 
protected under PIPEDA.  This is the result of Canada’s constitutional 
division of powers.  There is an argument for the federal government, as a 
result of its jurisdiction over trade and commerce, to have jurisdiction over 
privacy issues for commercial activities normally under provincial 
jurisdiction; however that same argument cannot be made for the 
employment relationship itself. 
PIPEDA allows collection, use, and disclosure of personal information 
only for purposes that a reasonable person would consider appropriate in the 
circumstances.94  Except where “inappropriate,” the organization is required 
to notify and obtain consent from the individual if the information the 
organization intends to collect, use, or disclose is about that individual.95  
“Inappropriate” circumstances include situations where legal, medical, or 
security reasons make it impossible or impractical to seek consent.96  The 
purpose of the collection of information must be identified before the 
collection, and the actual collection must be limited to that identified purpose 
unless the individual consents otherwise.97  The individual is free to 
                                                
94 PIPEDA, ibid at s 5(3). 
95 PIPEDA, ibid at Schedule I, 4.3.  
96 Also, s 7(1)(a) allows for collection of information if its collection is in the 
interest of the individual, but the individual’s consent cannot be obtained in a 
timely manner. 




withdraw his or her consent at any time.98  The organization is under an 
obligation to take steps to ensure that all information it collects is accurate, 
and the individual who is the subject of said information has a right to 
request and gain access to the information and ask for corrections of 
inaccurate information.99 
What does this mean for an employer collecting the social networking 
information about a job candidate or an employee?  It means that if the 
employer is a private sector institution working in a federally regulated 
industry, they may only collect social networking information about a job 
candidate or employee if that collection is done for purposes that would be 
considered reasonable in the circumstances.  This is not as restrictive as the 
Privacy Act – the only restriction on the information that is collected is that it 
be done for “reasonable” purposes.  It is not clarified whether this standard is 
the “reasonable employer” or the “reasonable employee;” just that the 
purposes of collection be reasonable.  Substantially, the same requirements 
for consent, prior notification, and direct collection that apply to the Privacy 
Act apply to PIPEDA.    
4.4 PROVINCIAL PRIVATE SECTOR PRIVACY LEGISLATION 
 As was mentioned above, provincial legislatures are acknowledged 
under section 26(2)(b) of PIPEDA as having the authority to enact legislation 
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that the federal government agrees will replace PIPEDA, so long as that 
legislation is found to be substantially similar to PIPEDA.  Thus far, the only 
provinces that have done so are Quebec, British Columbia, and Alberta.100  In 
all three of these provinces, the enactment of these statutes goes beyond what 
PIPEDA does for provincially regulated businesses, in that its scope is not 
limited to personal information collected for the commercial transactions.  
While Quebec’s legislation101 provides privacy protection similar to that 
provided by PIPEDA, something unique to the provincial statutes in Alberta 
and British Columbia is that they have separate definitions of “personal 
information” and “employee personal information/personal employee 
information,” and standards of collection, as well as certain requirements for 
the collection process differ depending whether the information being 
collected is deemed to be “personal information” or “employee personal 
information/personal employee information”. 
4.4.1 PERSONAL INFORMATION PROTECTION ACT OF BRITISH 
COLUMBIA [PIPA BC] 
                                                
100 Ontario has adopted such privacy legislation; however, the Personal 
Health Information Protection Act, 2004, SO 2004, c 3, Sch A pertains only to 
the protection of personal health information. 
101 An Act Respecting the Protection of Personal Information in the Private 
Sector, RSQ, chapter P-39 1 [PPIPS QUE].  One notable difference is at s 5, 
where the standard for collection of personal information is that “Any person 
collecting personal information to establish a file on another person or to 
record personal information in such a file may collect only the information 
necessary for the object of the file.”  This standard does not seem very 




 The stated purpose of PIPA BC102 is to “govern the collection, use and 
disclosure of personal information by organizations in a manner that 
recognizes both the right of individuals to protect their personal information 
and the need of organizations to collect, use or disclose personal information 
that a reasonable person would consider appropriate.”103 (emphasis added) 
PIPA BC applies to every “organization,” which is defined as including a 
person, unincorporated association, a trade union, a trust or a not for profit 
organization, and it also lists some exclusions – one of which is “a public 
body.”104  This is to say that organizations that fall under The Privacy Act, or 
any provincial equivalent do not fall under the purview of PIPA BC.  
“Personal Information” is defined as information about an identifiable 
individual, and includes employee personal information, but does not include 
contact information or work product information.105  Section 6 of PIPA BC 
provides that subject to some exceptions, no personal information is to be 
collected, used, or disclosed unless the individual gives consent.106  
Furthermore, prior to collecting the information, the organization is required 
to disclose to the individual the purposes for which the information is 
collected.107  The individual may withdraw their consent at any time,108 and if 
                                                
102 SBC 2003 c 63 [PIPA BC]. 
103 PIPA BC, ibid at s 2. 
104 PIPA BC, ibid at s 1. 
105 PIPA BC, ibid at s 1. 
106 Exceptions to this are in ss. 12, 15, and 18. 
107 PIPA BC, supra at note 102, s 10(1)(b). 




he or she does, the organization must 1) inform the individual the likely 
consequences of withdrawing his or her consent,109 and 2) must stop the 
collection, use, or disclosure of the individual’s personal information.110  
Finally, the actual collection has to be limited to information that a 
reasonable person would consider appropriate in the situation and that fulfill 
the purposes that the organization disclosed to the individual whose 
information is being collected.111  This definition of personal information most 
certainly includes social networking information; however, when the 
information being collected is the social networking information of a job 
candidate or an employee, it is classified as a different type of information – 
“employee personal information.” 
 With respect to employee personal information, PIPA BC has very 
different standards.  “Employee Personal Information” is personal 
information about an individual that is collected, used, or disclosed for the 
purposes reasonably required to establish, manage, or terminate an 
employment relationship, but it does not include personal information that is 
not about the individual’s employment.  An organization can collect employee 
personal information without the individual’s consent;112 however, before that 
collection is carried out, the organization must inform the individual that it 
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will be collecting the information and the purposes for the collection.113  The 
same standards apply for the use of employee personal information114, and 
disclosure of employee personal information.115  This is an important 
difference with all of the privacy legislation discussed above, as they all 
require consent before the collection, use, or disclosure of personal 
information (with certain exceptions).  The only standard for what employee 
personal information can be collected without consent is that the collection be 
reasonable for the purposes of establishing, maintaining, or terminating an 
employment relationship.  
 What does this mean for an employer collecting the social networking 
information about a job candidate or an employee?  It means that if the 
employer is a private sector institution in British Columbia, they may only 
collect social networking information about a job candidate or employee if the 
collection of that information is reasonable for employment purposes 
(establishing, maintaining, terminating).  This is essentially the same 
standard as PIPEDA, only it makes specific reference to the information’s 
relevance in the employment context.  Another important distinction is that 
under PIPA BC, unlike all of the privacy legislation discussed thus far, the 
employee or candidate does not need to consent to the collection of said 
information. 
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114 PIPA BC, ibid at s 16. 




4.4.2 PERSONAL INFORMATION PROTECTION ACT OF ALBERTA [PIPA 
AB] 
 The stated purpose of PIPA AB116 is to govern the collection, use, and 
disclosure of personal information by organizations in a manner that 
recognizes both the right an individual has to have his or her personal 
information protected and the organization’s need to collect, use, and disclose 
personal information for reasonable purposes.117  Section 4 of PIPA AB states 
that it applies to every organization and in respect to all personal 
information, and it lists some exceptions.118  One such exception, like PIPA 
BC, is any public body – meaning organizations that fall under the purview of 
the Privacy Act or any provincial equivalent.  An “organization,” under PIPA 
AB includes a corporation, an unincorporated association, a trade union, a 
partnership, and an individual acting in a commercial capacity, but does not 
include an individual acting in a personal or domestic capacity.119  “Personal 
Information” is defined as any information about an identifiable individual.  
According to section 7(1), an organization may not collect, use, or disclose an 
individual’s personal information unless the individual consents to the 
collection, use, or disclosure.120  Furthermore, the organization is required to 
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119  PIPA AB, ibid at s 1(i). 





collect the information directly from the individual unless the individual 
consents to the information being collected from another source.121  Prior to or 
on collecting the information, the organization must disclose to the individual 
the purposes of the collection.122  An individual may withdraw or vary his or 
her consent to the collection, use, or disclosure of the personal information.123  
Upon receipt of notice, the organization must inform the individual of the 
consequences of such a withdrawal or variation,124 and in the case of a 
withdrawal of consent, stop collecting, using, or disclosing information,125 and 
in the case of a variation of consent, abide by the consent as varied.126  The 
information that can be collected by an organization is limited to information 
that is used for reasonable purposes, and only to the extent that is reasonable 
for meeting the purposes for which the information is collected.127  As is the 
case with PIPA BC, social networking falls under the PIPA AB’s definition of 
personal information; however, when it comes to information about an 
employee or job candidate, there is a different definition of personal 
information with different standards. 
 “Personal Employee Information” is personal information about an 
individual who is a potential, current, or former employee of an organization 
                                                
121 PIPA AB, supra at note 116, s 7(1)(b). 
122 PIPA AB, ibid at s 13. 
123 PIPA AB, ibid at s 9(1). 
124 PIPA AB, ibid at s 9(2). 
125 PIPA AB, ibid at s 9(4)(a). 
126 PIPA AB, ibid at s 9(4)(b). 




that is reasonably required by the organization for the purposes of 1) 
establishing, managing, or terminating an employment relationship, or 2) 
managing a post-employment relationship, but does not include information 
that is unrelated to that relationship.128  Personal employee information can 
be collected without the consent of the individual if it is collected solely for 
the purposes of establishing, managing, or terminating an employment 
relationship between the organization and the individual.129  If, however, the 
individual is a current employee, he or she must be informed that the 
information will be collected, and the purposes of its collection; however, it is 
not necessary that the employee consent.130   The same standard is used for 
the use131 and disclosure132 of personal employee information.  The only 
standard that applies to the collection of personal employee information is 
that it be reasonable to collect that information.133  These are essentially the 
same standards as PIPA BC. 
 On the following two pages is a table dileneating the applicable 
variations among the statutes discussed in this chapter.
                                                
128 PIPA AB, ibid at s 1(j). 
129 PIPA AB, ibid at s 15(1)(a). 
130 PIPA AB, ibid at s 15(1)(c). 
131 PIPA AB, ibid at s 18(1). 
132 PIPA AB, ibid at s 21(1). 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































As can be seen in the table above, the legislation is fairly uniform across 
the board, with some important differences that can present significant 
discrepancies in privacy protection depending which statute applies to 
the information in question.  The legislation governing the public sector 
has more stringent requirements as to what information can be 
collected compared with the legislation regulating the private sector.   
Two outliers are PIPA BC and PIPA AB with their qualified standards 
for information relating to employment, and do not require consent 
prior to collection.   
4.6   THE TORT OF INVASION OF PRIVACY 
4.6.1 TORT CREATED BY STATUTE 
British Columbia, Saskatchewan, Newfoundland and Labrador, 
and Manitoba have created a statutory cause of action for invasion of 
privacy when a person without a claim of right134 willfully violates the 
privacy of another.135   
                                                
134 “Claim of right” in this context has been defined as an honest belief 
in a state of facts, which, if it existed, would be a legal justification or 
excuse – see Access to Information and Privacy, supra at note 80, HAP-
258. 
135 The Privacy Act, CCSM c P125 [Privacy Act MB]; Privacy Act, RSS 
1978, c P-24 [Privacy Act Sask]; Privacy Act, RSBC 1996, c 373 [Privacy 




These statutes have only been judicially considered to a very 
limited extent, and courts do not find readily in favour of a plaintiff.136  
The nature and degree of privacy to which an individual is entitled is 
that of what is reasonable in the circumstances,137 and the relationship 
between the plaintiff and the defendant is a relevant consideration.138  
However, it has been found that no invasion of privacy can occur where 
the plaintiff has consented to the act or conduct in question.139  As a 
result, the impact of this legislation on protection afforded to the 
collection of social networking information in the employment context is 
minimal.  What it amounts to is that in BC, Manitoba, Newfoundland 
and Labrador, and Saskatchewan, employers may need consent to 
collect an employee’s social networking information, if collecting that 
information is not reasonable in the circumstances.  And given the fact 
that PIPA BC does not even require consent prior to collecting such 
information, it is unlikely that to collect said information without 
consent would be considered unreasonable in the circumstances. 
Outside of British Columbia, Alberta, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, 
Quebec, and Newfondland and Labrador there is one group of employees 
                                                
136 Access to Information and Privacy, supra at note 80, HAP-258. 
137 See, for example, Privacy Act AB, supra at note 116, s 4(2)(b). 
138 See Pierre v Pacific Press Ltd, [1994] B.C.J. No. 583 (BCCA).  
139 See Walker v British Columbia College of Dental Surgeons, [1997] 
BCJ No 433 (BCSC); Cottrell v Manitoba (Workers Compensation 
Board) [1997] MJ No 249 (Man QB); and K (SJ) v Chapple, [1999] SJ No 




that do not seem to have the benefit of any legislated privacy protection 
whatsoever – employees or potential employees working in the private 
sector for companies that conduct business in industries that are 
regulated by a provincial government.  These employers do not seem to 
fall under the purview of any of privacy legislation.  As a result, there is 
no legislated privacy protection for these employees or job candidates, 
and the only place these people can find privacy protection with respect 
to their social networking activity can be found in the common law. 
4.6.2 RIGHT TO PRIVACY AT COMMON LAW 
 In Somwar v McDonald’s Restaurants of Canada,140 Justice 
Stinson first expressed that the time has come for the court to recognize 
the tort of invasion of privacy.  In Somwar, the defendant conducted a 
credit background check on the plaintiff (who was an employee of the 
defendant) without the permission of the plaintiff.  While 
acknowledging that Ontario law was unsettled as to whether a common 
law tort of invasion of privacy could exist, Stinson wrote that  
with advancements in technology, personal data of an 
individual can now be collected, accessed (properly and 
improperly), and disseminated more easily than ever 
before. There is a resulting increased concern in our 
society about the risk of unauthorized access to an 
individual's personal information. The traditional torts 
such as nuisance, trespass, and harassment may not 
provide adequate protection against infringement of an 
individual's privacy interests. Protection of those privacy 
                                                




interests by providing a common law remedy for their 
violation would be consistent with Charter values and an 
"incremental revision" and logical extension of the 
existing jurisprudence141 
 
In Somwar, it was not necessary for Justice Stinson to reach a 
conclusion whether the tort of invasion of privacy should be recognized 
by the court142; however, Stinson’s decision proved to be the first step 
that eventually led to the groundbreaking decision of the Ontario Court 
of Appeal in Jones v Tsige.143 
 Squarely at issue in Jones was whether there exists a tort for 
invasion of privacy.  Jones and Tsige worked at the same branch of the 
Bank of Montreal.144  Jones did not know Tsige, but Tsige was in a 
common-law relationship with Jones’s ex-husband.145  Over the course 
of a four-year period, Tsige used her workplace computer to access 
Jones’s banking records at least 174 times.146  The records included 
financial information, as well as personal information; Tsige did not 
publish, distribute, or record the information – she only looked through 
it.147  Jones became suspicious and complained to her employer, and 
                                                
141 Somwar, ibid at paragraph 29. 
142 This was a decision on a motion brought by the defendant seeking to 
dismiss the plaintiff’s action on the ground that the statement of claim 
discloses no reasonable cause of action. 
143 Jones, supra at note 26. 
144 Jones, ibid at paragraph 4. 
145 Jones, ibid at paragraph 4. 
146 Jones, ibid at paragraph 4. 




when asked about it, Tsige admitted to her actions, said she had no 
legitimate reason for looking at Jones’s records, acknowledged it was a 
violation of BMO’s code of conduct, and apologized for her actions; BMO 
disciplined Tsige by suspending her for a week without pay and denying 
her a bonus.148  Jones sued Tsige, asserting that her privacy interest in 
her banking records had been irreversibly destroyed, claimed damages 
of $70,000 for invasion of privacy, as well as punitive and exemplary 
damages of $20,000; Jones’s action was dismissed on the ground that 
the tort of invasion of privacy did not exist.149  Jones appealed the 
decision to the Ontario Court of Appeal. 
 In a unanimous decision of a three-member panel, the Court of 
Appeal allowed Jones’s appeal and awarded $10,000, stating that, “it is 
appropriate for this court to confirm the existence of a right of action for 
intrusion upon seclusion. Recognition of such a cause of action would 
amount to an incremental step that is consistent with the role of this 
court to develop the common law in a manner consistent with the 
changing needs of society.”150  So, the new tort of “intrusion upon 
seclusion” was born in Canadian law.  In defining the tort, Justice 
Sharpe cited the following classification by Professor Robert Prosser 
that has been adopted by the American Restatement (Second) of Torts 
                                                
148 Jones, ibid at paragraphs 5-6. 
149 Jones v Tsige, [2011] OJ No 1273. 




(2010): “One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon 
the seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to 
liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the invasion would be 
highly offensive to a reasonable person.”151 
 In coming to his decision, Justice Sharpe wrote extensively about 
the importance of the legal protection of privacy, and the threat that 
technological advancement poses to that threat.  From paragraphs 66-
69, Justice Sharpe writes the following: 
The case law, while certainly far from conclusive, 
supports the existence of such a cause of action. Privacy 
has long been recognized as an important underlying 
and animating value of various traditional causes of 
action to protect personal and territorial privacy. 
Charter jurisprudence recognizes privacy as a 
fundamental value in our law and specifically identifies, 
as worthy of protection, a right to informational privacy 
that is distinct from personal and territorial privacy. The 
right to informational privacy closely tracks the same 
interest that would be protected by a cause of action for 
intrusion upon seclusion. Many legal scholars and 
writers who have considered the issue support 
recognition of a right of action for breach of privacy… 
 
For over one hundred years, technological change has 
motivated the legal protection of the individual's right to 
privacy. In modern times, the pace of technological 
change has accelerated exponentially. Legal scholars … 
have written of "the pressing need to preserve 'privacy' 
which is being threatened by science and technology to 
the point of surrender" … The internet and digital 
technology have brought an enormous change in the way 
we communicate and in our capacity to capture, store 
and retrieve information. As the facts of this case 
indicate, routinely kept electronic databases render our 
                                                




most personal financial information vulnerable. 
Sensitive information as to our health is similarly 
available, as are records of the books we have borrowed 
or bought, the movies we have rented or downloaded, 
where we have shopped, where we have travelled, and 
the nature of our communications by cell phone, e-mail 
or text message. 
 
It is within the capacity of the common law to evolve to 
respond to the problem posed by the routine collection 
and aggregation of highly personal information that is 
readily accessible in electronic form. Technological 
change poses a novel threat to a right of privacy that has 
been protected for hundreds of years by the common law 
under various guises and that, since 1982 and the 
Charter, has been recognized as a right that is integral 
to our social and political order. 
 
Adopting the formulation for “intrusion upon seclusion” that is set out 
in the American Restatement of Torts, Justice Sharpe explicitly set out 
the elements of the tort as “first, the defendant’s conduct must have 
been intentional, within which I would include reckless; second, that the 
defendant must have invaded, without lawful justification, the 
plaintiff’s private affairs or concerns; and third, that a reasonable 
person would regard the invasion as highly offensive causing distress, 
humiliation, or anguish.”152  However, it was unequivocally stated that 
while proof of economic harm or harm to economic interests is not an 
element of the tort, given the intangible nature of privacy interests, 
damages for the tort will be a “modest conventional sum.”153  The 
                                                
152 Jones, ibid at paragraph 71. 




creation of this new tort in Jones has been recognized in decisions in 
jurisdictions outside of Ontario.154   
It should be noted that Justice Sharpe found that the privacy 
interest at stake here was classified as “informational privacy,” which 
was defined as "the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to 
determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information 
about them is communicated to others."155  The implications of such a 
categorization of privacy will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 8. 
 What this exploration of the landscape of Canadian privacy law 
shows is that the degree of privacy afforded to an individual’s social 
networking information can vary greatly depending on the location and 
industry in which they are working or seeking to find a job.  The next 
Chapter will explore how these privacy protections actually work, or fail 
to work, to protect an individual’s social networking information in the 
pre-employment phase – when an individual is seeking a job.
                                                
154 See Trout Point Lodge Ltd v Handshoe [2012] NSJ No 427 at 
paragraph 35; BDC v BJB [2012] YJ No 91 at paragraph 19. 




CHAPTER 5 Application to the Pre-Employment Phase 
 Given the plethora of information that can be found on an 
individual’s Facebook account, many employers have incorporated 
“creeping” as part of their candidate-vetting process.  An emerging 
trend in the hiring process is what is called a social networking 
background check.  What this amounts to is looking into the prospective 
employee’s social networking activity to gain a fuller picture of who the 
candidate is and what they are like.  According to a March 2010 survey, 
90 percent of employment recruiters said they used web search engines 
to research candidates, and 46 percent said that they ruled candidates 
out on that basis.156  According to a 2009 survey, as many as 45 percent 
of respondents used social networking background checks as a tool for 
screening candidates.157  Social networking background checks can vary 
case-by-case in terms of their degree of intrusion upon the private 
affairs of the candidate – it range anywhere from a “Google” search of 
the candidate’s name, to requesting the candidate to “friend” the 
                                                
156 The survey, conducted by ExecuNet Executive Insider March 2010, 
was republished by Meg Montford, “Why #Jobseekers MUST Manage 
Their Online Reputation” Career Chaos (1 March 2010) online: 
<http://coachmeg.typepad.com/career_chaos/2010/03/why-jobseekers-
must-manage-online-reputation.html>. 
157 Rosemary Haefner, “More Employers Screening Candidates via 






employer or a human resources staff member on Facebook158, to 
requesting that the candidate login to Facebook from a company 
computer during the interview.159  Some employers even go so far as to 
request a candidate’s login information and password during the 
interview itself so they can peruse the candidate’s Facebook account.160  
There even exist businesses that offer social networking background 
checks as a service to employers who wish to find out more about the 
candidates that they interview.161   
 The reason an employer would want to look at a candidate’s social 
networking content is fairly obvious.  Hiring an employee can be a very 
important decision, and the potential cost of hiring the wrong employee 
can be significant; as was mentioned in previous Chapters, social 
networking accounts can be a very fertile source of information into the 
personality and lifestyle of an individual.  An employer can gain a 
certain personal insight about an individual and his or her lifestyle that 
                                                
158 Information and Privacy Commissioner (Ontario), Reference Check: 
Is Your Boss Watching? The New World of Social Media: Privacy and 
Your Facebook Profile (April 2012), online: 
<http://www.ipc.on.ca/images/Resources/facebook-refcheck.pdf> at p 4 
[Reference Check]. 
159 Reference Check, ibid at p 5. 
160 Morgan Campbell, “Would you reveal your Facebook password for a 
job?” The Toronto Star (20 March 2012) online: 
<http://www.thestar.com/business/article/1148973--would-you-reveal-
your-facebook-password-for-a-job>. 
161 For example, American companies include Social Intelligence, 
Sterling InfoSystems, InfoCheckUSA, and Tandem Select, and a 




may not be so easily retrievable through resumes, cover letters, 
reference checks, or even face-to-face conversations.  For these reasons, 
it is understandable why an employer may want to delve into a 
prospective employee’s social networking information. 
 In the United States, an employer looking through a job 
candidate’s social networking information may not be doing so out of 
curiosity or a wish to find the right “fit”; as a result of the tort of 
“Negligent Hiring,” an employer may even argue that he or she is 
legally obligated to perform such background checks on potential 
employees.162  The doctrine of negligent hiring imposes upon employers 
liability for harm caused to third parties by the employer’s employee; 
however, it is different from vicarious liability in that the liability can 
be imposed regardless of whether the employee was acting within his or 
her capacity as an employee.163  Liability will be imposed when an 
employer “places an unfit person in an employment situation that 
entails an unreasonable risk of harm to others.”164  The primary focus in 
determining liability is to examine the adequacy of the employer’s pre-
employment investigation into the employee’s background.165  While 
                                                
162 Robert Sprague, “Rethinking Information Privacy in an Age of 
Online Transparency” (2008) 25 Hofstra Lab & Empl J 395 at 398 
[Rethinking Information Privacy]. 
163 Rethinking Information Privacy, ibid at 398. 
164 Rosanne Lienhard, “Negligent Retention of Employees:  An 
Expanding Doctrine” (1996) 63 Def Couns J 389 at 389. 




this is an American tort, it is entirely possible that just like intrusion 
upon seclusion, negligent hiring makes its way into Canadian tort law.  
It is certainly not a stretch to think that a situation in which an 
unreasonable risk is created for others as a result of hiring a person who 
is unfit for an employment situation could be covered by existing 
negligence principles in Canadian tort law.166  Consequently, it gives 
employers another reason to find out all they can about a candidate 
prior to offering them employment.  However, if the determination of 
liability comes down to the adequacy of the employer’s investigation into 
the candidate’s background, the issue becomes the extent to which an 
employer should reasonably be expected to investigate the candidate’s 
background.  In Chapter 8, I will explore, in the context of social 
networking information, the extent to which it should be permissible for 
an employer to delve into the affairs of a job candidate.  While I will be 
                                                
166 See Allen Linden, Bruce Feldthusen et al, “Negligence” Halsbury’s 
Laws of Canada, (2012) online (QL) at HNE-2, where the following six-
part examination for when a cause of action for negligence arisis.  1) 
The claimant must suffer some damage; 2) The damage suffered must 
be caused by the conduct of the defendant; 3) The defendant’s conduct 
must be negligent, that is, in breach of the standard of care set by law; 
4) There must be a duty recognized by the law to avoid this damage; 5) 
The conduct of the defendant must be a proximate or legal cause of the 
loss or, stated in another way, the damage should not be too remote as a 
result of the defendant’s conduct; 6) The conduct of the plaintiff should 
not be such as to bar or reduce recovery, that is, the plaintiff must not 
be guilty of contributory negligence and must not voluntarily assume 
the risk.  Under this test, it is not difficult to contemplate a situation in 
which an employer’s failure to adequately investigate the background of 




exploring the extent to which such a background check should be 
limited, this should give an indication as to the degree of social 
networking background check that an employer should be reasonably 
expected to conduct. 
 Indeed, these social networking background checks give rise to 
some new legal issues.  This Chapter will examine the way Canadian 
law works (or does not work) to address these issues. 
5.1  APPLICATION OF EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS LEGISLATION 
 As mentioned in Chapter 2, each province has legislation that 
substantively regulates the employment relationship within that 
province.  For the most part, these Acts apply to employers and 
employees.  These pieces of legislation do not use uniform wording in 
defining an “employee.” Typical definitions under the Acts include such 
persons as follows:  an individual employed to do work who receives or 
is entitled to wages,167 a homeworker,168 and a person who receives 
training from the employer or the employer’s business.169  Despite the 
wording not being uniform across the board, for the most part, the 
substance of who is considered to be an “employee” under provincial 
employment standards legislation is broadly similar.  Definitions of 
“employer” in Employment Standards legislation, while also not 
                                                
167 Employment Standards Code, RSA 2000, c E-9 s 1(1)(k). 
168 Employment Standards Act, SO 2000 c 41 s 1(1). 




uniform, tend to include persons who are responsible for the payment of 
wages to employees,170 and a person who has control or direction of an 
employee.171 
 While the steps that lead up to the creation of the employment 
contract are critical to the employment relationship itself, definitions of 
employee and employer under these Acts do not appear to pertain to the 
pre-employment phase.  The only situation in which a prospective 
employee receives any protection under Employment Standards 
legislation is with respect to lie detector tests in Ontario and New 
Brunswick.172  Outside of this context, prospective employees do not 
receive any protection from Employment Standards legislation until 
they enter into an employment contract with the employer.  As a result, 
it would appear that any legal issues arising from a social networking 
background check, despite the fact that they pertain directly to the 
creation of an employment contract, do not fall under the ambit of any 
Employment Standards legislation. 
 In the provisions of the New Brunswick and Ontario Employment 
Standards legislation referred to above, no employer is permitted to 
request that a prospective employee submit to a lie detector test.  This is 
thought provoking.  It is safe to assume that the reason for these 
                                                
170 Labour Standards Act, RSS 1979 c L-1 s 2 (e). 
171 Employment Standards Act, RSBC, supra at note 169, s 1(1). 
172 Employment Standards Act, SO, supra at note 170, s 68 and New 




provisions is the product of the intrusive nature and inherent 
unreliability of lie detector tests.  It is not a stretch to draw an analogy 
here between a lie detector test and certain forms of social networking 
background checks, especially when all an employer asks for is a 
candidate’s login name and password – to look through a candidate’s 
Facebook account in this way is both extremely intrusive, and it would 
be very difficult for the employer to be able discern the accurate social 
networking information from that which is unreliable. 
5.2  DEGREES OF INVASIVENESS 
At this point I think it is useful to list what I consider to be the differing 
degrees of invasiveness in social networking background checks.  I 
divide them into three levels of invasiveness and label them as (1) 
password, (2) public, and (3) ‘in-between’. 
5.2.1  PASSWORD 
The type of social networking background check that I label “password” 
has the highest level of invasiveness.  In this type of background check, 
the employer requests (or requires) the candidate’s social networking 
login information and password, and explores the candidate’s social 
networking account on his or her own.  During such a search, it is 




information, information from third parties, and there certainly exist 
alternatives to this search to retrieve only information that a reasonable 
person would consider appropriate in the circumstances.  It is my 
position that such a background check should be deemed inappropriate 
in any pre-employment circumstance. 
5.2.2  PUBLIC 
The type of social networking background check that I label “public” has 
the lowest level of invasiveness.  In such a background check, the 
employer looks only at the candidate’s social networking information 
that is publicly available – meaning the information that the candidate 
does not have under any privacy protection and can be found via a 
Google or Facebook search.  While such a background check could still 
very likely lead to collection of irrelevant information, and such 
information could potentially form the basis of a privacy or human 
rights complaint (to be discussed below), I would contend that by 
making the information completely accessible to the public, the 
candidate is consenting to the possibility of the information being at 
least seen by anyone with access to the internet.173 
5.2.3  IN-BETWEEN 
                                                
173 I am not, however, saying that the candidate is consenting to a 





The type of social networking background check that I label “in 
between” is the trickiest.  It could range from the employer requesting 
(or requiring) to be ‘Friends’ with the candidate to requesting that the 
candidate login to his or her social networking site and navigate certain 
parts of his or her account while the employer looks on.  The 
invasiveness of the background check depends on the nature of the 
background check, and in the In-Between category, the candidate has at 
least some level of control as to what the employer will see (through 
privacy settings), or direct knowledge of what the employer has seen (if 
they are present for the background check).  Whether the background 
check in this category should be allowed will depend on a case-by-case 
basis.  This will be further explored in Chapter 8. 
5.3  A RISK FOR EMPLOYERS: HUMAN RIGHTS 
 Given the sheer volume and depth of information contained on a 
social networking profile and account, employers who delve into the 
social networking information of a candidate set themselves up for a 
potential human rights violation.  The Canadian Human Right Act 
prohibits refusing to employ and discriminate a candidate on the basis 
of a prohibited ground.174  Provincial human rights statutes have 
                                                
174 Canadian Human Rights Act, RSC 1985 c H-6 s 7.  The prohibited 
grounds referred to in s 7 can be found in s 3(1) and include race, 
national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, age, sex, sexual orientation, 




similar provisions.175  Facebook profiles, whether accessed via Google 
search, as a “friend,” or by logging into the user’s account, almost all 
contain information that could fall within one of the prohibited grounds 
of discrimination. 
 Under the “Application for Employment” heading, the Ontario 
Human Rights Code provides as follows: 
The right under section 5 to equal treatment with 
respect to employment is infringed where a form of 
application for employment is used or a written or oral 
inquiry is made of an applicant that directly or indirectly 
classifies or indicates qualifications by a prohibited 
ground of discrimination.176 
 
In commenting about what this provision of the Code means for the 
employment application phase, Professor David Doorey has written the 
following: 
Section 23(2) says that an employer can’t ask a job 
applicant for information that “directly or indirectly” 
classifies a person by a prohibited ground.  In other 
words, it is none of an employer’s business if you are 
married or single (family status), whether you are gay, 
straight, or bisexual (sexual orientation), what your 
religion is (creed) or your race, if you are Aboriginal, 
what your skin colour is, where you are from, how old 
you are, whether you have children (family status), and 
whether you have a disability. Some of these things will 
be evident by the interview stage (like skin colour and 
maybe disability), but the employer certainly cannot ask 
you to disclose other information about prohibited 
                                                                                                                                  
which a pardon has been granted or in respect of which a record 
suspension has been ordered. 
175 See, for example, Ontario Human Rights Code, RSO 1990, c H.19 s 
5(1). 




grounds that are not self-evident in the interview. 
 Moreover, Section 23 doesn’t just ban the question “Are 
you disabled?”, it bans other questions that are likely to 
give the employer the answer to that question, such as 
“Can you lift 50 pounds and stand for extended periods 
of time?”.  The objective is to keep information about the 
applicant’s association with prohibited grounds out of 
the hands of employers during the recruitment 
stage.177178 
 
As previously stated, Facebook profiles, whether accessed via Google 
search, as a “friend,” or by logging into the users account, almost all 
contain information that could fall within one of the prohibited grounds 
of discrimination.  The Ontario Human Rights Commission issued a 
statement (on Facebook) saying that employers should not engage in the 
practice of asking job applications for access to information on their 
social networking sites and that doing so could open them up to a claim 
of discrimination.179 
                                                
177 David Doorey, “Can an Employer ask a Job Applicant for their 
Facebook Password?” Doorey’s Workplace Law Blog: Thoughts on 
Canadian Labour & Employment Law for Students & Others (20 March 
2012) online: <http://www.yorku.ca/ddoorey/lawblog/?p=4995>. 
178 It should also be mentioned here that an employer can ask questions 
about what are known as Bona Fide Occupational Requirements 
[BFORs], for example, asking someone seeking a position as a priest in 
an Anglican Church if they are Anglican; see British Columbia (Public 
Service Employee Relations Commission) v. British Columbia 
Government and Service Employees' Union (B.C.G.S.E.U.) [1999] S.C.J. 
No. 46. 
179 Ontario Human Rights Commission, “Statement regarding 





 While Professor Doorey is of the opinion that accessing a 
candidate’s Facebook page could be a violation of the Ontario Human 
Rights Code, the language of s. 23(2) only refers to the classification of a 
candidate by a prohibited ground; it seems to be concerning the use of 
the content found in the candidate’s social networking information – not 
the viewing (or collection) of the information.  This is an important 
distinction.  In order for a human rights complaint to be successful, the 
applicant would need to prove that the employer used the information 
on the site to classify the applicant based on a prohibited ground – this 
would be very difficult.  While showing that the employer had access to 
the social networking contents does raise suspicion, it proves only that 
there was access – it proves nothing with respect to how the employer 
actually used the information, or whether it played any part in an 
employer classifying the candidate based on a prohibited ground of 
discrimination.  The reality of the situation is that, for the most part, 
those who are put in charge of the hiring process make the actual hiring 
decisions behind closed doors.  If the basis for which a candidate is not 
chosen is actually based upon information found in his or her social 
networking content (and pertains to a prohibited ground of 
discrimination), a prudent employer who is mindful of a potential 
human rights action would not openly state that this is the reason the 




the employer will likely cite those.  Absent some concrete disclosure 
from the employer about how they used the information, or the 
candidate somehow obtaining a copy of an internal memo or email 
written to that effect, a candidate launching human rights complaint 
based on the employer’s access to his or her social networking content 
would encounter great difficulty in terms of proof.180  As a result, the 
practical efficacy of human rights legislation to address this practice is 
minimal.  And while employers certainly do, in reality, open themselves 
up to the possibility of violating human rights legislation by looking into 
a candidate’s social networking content, absent some slip up on their 
part in terms of disclosure to the applicant, they can rest easy that it 
would be very difficult for a complainant candidate to make out a case 
under human rights law as it currently stands. 
5.4  ANOTHER RISK FOR EMPLOYERS: UNFAIR LABOUR PRACTICES 
 The employer is in no way in direct control of what a job 
candidate has written in his or her Facebook account, nor does the 
employer have any indication that something may or may not be written 
on a candidate’s Facebook account until the employer makes specific 
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explorations to find out.  As a result, it is entirely possible that a job 
candidate has something on his or her Facebook account that would 
lead a reader to believe that he or she is in some capacity a supporter of 
workers’ unions.  Upon discovering this, an employer has put himself or 
herself in a very tricky situation, as discriminating in the hiring process 
upon that basis would be commission of an unfair labour practice.181  
Here, however, the same problems exist as in human rights matters – 
unless there is some kind of disclosure on the part of employer, it would 
be difficult to prove that this was the reason the employer decided not to 
hire the candidate.  However, with an allegation of such an unfair 
labour practice, the onus rests on the employer to prove that he or she 
did not commit an unfair labour practice.182  This makes it more difficult 
for an employer to circumvent the legislation; if an employer has a 
history of anti-union animus, his or her alternate explanation for the 
hiring decision will be looked at with more scrutiny. 
5.4  SPECIFIC LEGISLATION 
 In Nova Scotia, a Liberal MLA has introduced a Private 
Member’s Bill that seeks – similar to the lie detector prohibition in New 
Brunswick and Ontario – to prohibit an employer from requiring an 
employee or prospective employee to provide the employer with access 
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to his or her social networking account or discriminating against the 
employee or prospective employee for refusing to provide access to his or 
her social networking account.183  The proposed Bill states that an 
employer shall not require the password or related account information 
for the purpose of gaining access to the person’s account,184 demand 
access in any manner to a person’s account,185 or penalize, in any way, a 
person because he or she refused to comply with such a request.186  It is 
important to note that an employer is not prohibited, under the Bill, to 
obtain information that is in the public domain – meaning that only 
social networking information that is under some sort of privacy 
protection via the website falls under the ambit of the Bill.187  The Nova 
Scotia government is currently considering the Bill.  Similar legislation 
currently exists in a handful of American states, and the United States 
Senate is considering similar legislation at the federal level.188 
                                                
183 Bill No. X (as introduced), An Act to Amend Chapter 246 of the 
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General Assembly, Nova Scotia, 61 Elizabeth II, 2012, Private Member’s 
Bill, Andrew Younger, MLA for Dartmouth East [Bill No X]. 
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188 Tina Giesbrecht and Roland Hung, “Are Employers in British 
Columbia and Alberta stepping outside privacy boundaries in 
requesting access to a job applicant’s social media profile?” McCarthy 





 It is important to note that unlike the lie detector provisions in 
New Brunswick and Ontario, the only focus of this Bill is to prohibit the 
demanding or requiring that an employee or potential employee give the 
employer access to his or her social networking site (and penalizing the 
employee or potential employee for refusing to do so).  This is to say that 
while the Bill does prevent an employer from requiring either login 
information, or access to a candidate’s social networking account, it does 
not prevent an employer from requesting either login information, or 
access to a candidate’s social networking account.  This presents some 
significant practical difficulties and inadequacies.  Practically speaking, 
during the pre-employment process, if an employer requests access to a 
job candidate’s social networking account (either by requesting the 
password or requesting the candidate login in the presence of the 
employer), the candidate is left with two choices.  One choice the 
candidate has is to comply such a request.  The other choice the 
candidate has is to refuse such a request.  While under the Bill he or she 
legally has every right to make either choice, it is not out of the question 
to suggest that to choose the latter would likely cause the candidate to 
fall out of favour with the employer.  A job candidate is in a very 
vulnerable position; the inequality in bargaining power referred to in 
Chapter 2 is very much at play in such a situation. A job candidate’s 




information or access to the employer; it could be nothing more than a 
product of the circumstance – the candidate wants the job.  The request, 
while in the form of a request, is practically a condition in order to be 
given serious consideration.  Furthermore, the provision in the Bill that 
prohibits an employer from penalizing any person because he or she has 
refused to comply with such a request clearly implies that the employer 
is entitled to make the request, such that it cannot be assumed, as a 
matter of interpretation, that a request is (because of a power 
imbalance) equivalent to an illegal demand.  Moreover, this provision in 
the legislation is rendered practically ineffective for the same reasons 
(difficulty with proof) as human rights legislation (discussed above).  In 
order for a candidate to have any reasonable possibility of success with 
a claim that the employer did not consider them because of their refusal 
to provide access to his or her social networking account, the employer 
would need to disclose that it was for this reason that they did not hire 
the candidate – practically speaking, even if this were the case, it is 
extremely unlikely that a mindful employer would do such a thing. 
5.5  BRITISH COLUMBIA NDP INVESTIGATION 
 In March 2011, The Office of the Information and Privacy 
Commissioner for British Columbia investigated the New Democratic 




evaluate potential candidates.189  At issue was a practice by the BC 
NDP to ask candidates for passwords to their social networking content 
as a response to an incident from a previous provincial election after 
controversial photographs of an NDP candidate surfaced on Facebook.190  
The purpose of the investigation was to determine whether, under BC 
PIPA, the collection of the passwords was appropriate in the 
circumstances.  Because candidates are not employees of the party, the 
information was deemed to be “personal information” as opposed to 
“personal employee information.”  Nonetheless, the only real difference 
is that were it deemed personal employee information, the party would 
not need the consent of the candidate to collect the information and in 
this case because the party collected the passwords of the candidates, 
consent was obviously given.  The standard for the collection of the 
information is that it can only be for purposes that a reasonable person 
would consider appropriate in the circumstances.191  
To determine reasonableness, the investigation evaluated several 
factors:  the purposes of collection and surrounding circumstances, the 
kind and amount of information collected, the uses to which it will be 
                                                
189 Summary of the Office of the Information and Privacy 
Commissioner’s Investigation of the BC NDP’s use of social media and 
passwords to evaluate candidates, P11-01-MS, online: 
<http://www.oipc.bc.ca/Mediation_Cases/PDFs/2011.P11-01-MS.pdf> 
[BC NDP Investigation]. 
190 BC NDP Investigation, ibid at p 1. 




put, and whether the BC NDP had any reasonable alternatives to 
achieve its goals.192 The investigation acknowledged that logging into an 
individual’s social networking account gives the user access to an excess 
of information, and found that BC NDP collected a large amount of 
information, including information that may be outdated, irrelevant or 
inaccurate.193  Furthermore, it found that BC NDP collected information 
about third parties that it did not have consent to collect.194  Finally, it 
found that BC NDP did not explore any other reasonable alternatives.195  
As a result, the Privacy Commissioner found that the BC NDP did not 
have the authority to collect the passwords of candidates under BC 
PIPA.196 
While this case does potentially provide some insight as to how 
similar cases might be treated in the employment context, it is 
important to note that the nature of choosing a political candidate to 
represent a political party is different from choosing an employee.  More 
and more politicians and political candidates are using social 
networking in the capacity of their positions to connect with voters and 
constituents.  Perhaps an analogy can be made between a political party 
looking into a candidate’s social networking account and an employer 
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looking into the account of a candidate who is being considered for a 
position in public relations or a related field.  However, a key difference 
is that a political party is choosing the person to be their candidate – not 
a person to fill a position as a candidate.  The links between the position 
and the candidate’s personhood are very strong in the political situation, 
and the public relations aspect of the position is absolutely paramount.  
In most employment situations, on the other had, while it is important 
what kind of personal life the job candidate leads197, it is much less 
“reasonable” for an employer to feel a need to pry into the personal 
affairs of the job candidate.  Nonetheless, here the NDP was seeking to 
perform the most intrusive of social networking background checks, and 
to do so was found to be a violation of PIPA BC. 
5.6  FACEBOOK’S REACTION 
 On March 23rd, 2012, Erin Egan, the Chief Privacy Officer of 
Facebook issued a statement titled “Protecting Your Passwords and 
Your Privacy.”198  The statement condemns employers for requesting 
prospective employees to provide their passwords to their Facebook 
accounts.  The statement warns employers that doing so could result in 
legal action from Facebook, warns users that to provide someone your 
password is a direct violation of Facebook’s Statement of Rights and 
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Responsibilities, and reiterates that every user has a right to keep their 
password to themselves.  Finally, the statement asserts that Facebook 
will do everything in its power to ensure that this right is protected. 
 This has not amounted to all that much.  Contrary to what was 
written, Facebook has not actually taken any legal action in this regard.  
In fact, even if Facebook did wish to do something, it is unlikely that 
they could take any action against an employer who has no relationship 
with Facebook.199  What this essentially amounts to is Facebook giving 
notice to its users that it cares about their privacy – it could be seen as 
something of an advertisement.  However, despite Facebook’s inaction, 
this statement does in some way display that Facebook is aware that its 
users are experiencing privacy concerns, and while Facebook may not be 
taking legal action for this type of violation of its Statement of Rights 
and Responsibilities, its actions (including its aforementioned 
compliance with the requests of the Office of the Privacy Commissioner) 
have shown a willingness to strive towards securing effective privacy 
controls for its users. 
5.7  PRIVACY COMMISSIONER SOCIAL NETWORKING BACKGROUND 
CHECK GUIDELINES 
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 The Privacy Commissioners of both Alberta and British Columbia 
have released guidelines for employers with respect to statutory 
compliance specifically in the practice of conducting social networking 
background checks for prospective employees.200 
 The guidelines from the British Columbia Privacy Commissioner 
identify the following three possible risks that an employer could most 
likely encounter201 when conducting a social networking background 
check:  overreliance on an individual’s consent to the collection of the 
information, the amount and relevancy of the information collected 
during the background check, and the accuracy of the information.202  
While these guidelines are useful in that they point out some of the 
potential dangers of social networking background checks to employers, 
they do not address or seem to solve any of the core problems that can 
result from a social networking background check. 
 In terms of information accuracy, the Guidelines point out that in 
any social networking background check, there is a risk that the 
information found could be inaccurate.  For example, the Guidelines 
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specifically warn of mislabeled photos, out-of-date information, viewing 
the wrong profile altogether, or even viewing a profile that was set up 
by an imposter.203  There is an obligation under all applicable Privacy 
legislation that the employer collects accurate information.204  In 
conducting the social networking background check, employers open 
themselves up to a very real possibility of collecting inaccurate 
information, especially considering the fact that in British Columbia (or 
Alberta, for that matter) there is no requirement placed on the employer 
to first obtain the consent of the candidate to perform the social 
networking background check. 
 The problem here is that if the background check is being 
conducted by only the employer, and the candidate does not view and 
validate or invalidate the information, there is absolutely no way for the 
employer to know for certain whether the information is accurate.  
Furthermore, for information that the employer sees that is of such a 
nature that to take it into consideration would amount to discrimination 
in human rights law, the employer has a specific interest in not 
mentioning the information to the candidate, for fear of a human rights 
complaint if the candidate is not hired; this increases the likelihood of 
the collection of inaccurate information, because the candidate will 
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likely not get the chance to validate or invalidate the information that is 
obtained. 
 In terms of overreliance on consent, the Guidelines warn 
employers to be mindful of who has given consent.  While BC PIPA, for 
example, does not require consent for personal information about an 
individual that is collected, used, or disclosed for the purposes 
reasonably required to establish, manage, or terminate a contractual 
employment relationship, it does not allow for the collection of personal 
information of people who are not job candidates, or information that is 
not reasonably required for employment purposes (i.e. third party 
information).  A social networking background check is almost certain to 
lead an employer to information about individuals other than the job 
candidate.  As a result, the personal information about those third 
parties will certainly be viewed without that third party’s consent, and 
the employer, as a result, would be running afoul of the legislation.205  
The problem with this is that the third party would need to be the one 
to launch a complaint with respect to the unauthorized collection of 
their personal information – and they are likely to be completely 
unaware that their personal information is actually collected.  
Furthermore, in terms of the consent of the candidate, as was discussed 
above in this Chapter, there are inherent issues as to whether the 
                                                




candidate’s consent is tantamount to actual consent, or whether it is 
more so a product of their vulnerability in the situation (i.e. they are 
trying to get a job). 
 In terms of the collection of irrelevant information, the 
Guidelines merely warn of the superfluity of information that can be 
obtained via a social networking background check.  Some of that 
information will likely not be permitted to be collected under almost all 
personal information privacy statutes (not to mention human rights 
statutes or even labour relations statutes).206  While the warning is 
absolutely warranted, the fact that the social networking background 
check contains all of this information is likely exactly the reason why 
the employer wishes to perform the background check – it can contain 
all of this information and insight about the candidate.  Employers 
already know this.  If they did not know this, social networking 
background checks likely would not exist. 
 One reality that is missed here is that while viewing social 
networking information does amount to collection of personal 
information under privacy legislation, the actual process of navigating a 
social networking account is more akin to “viewing” than “collecting.”  
The hiring employer will view the account and the information 
contained therein.  Regardless of whether they print the information 
                                                




and collect it in some physical form, the information has been seen, and 
cannot be unseen.  What is seen will, no doubt, factor in some way into 
the hiring decision – if it were not important, the social media 
background check would be forgone.  But because of the non-physical, 
“viewing” nature of a social networking background check, significant 
issues are presented when it comes to any proof of misuse of the 
information.  Both privacy and human rights legislation fail to address 
this reality, as they require some proof of a specific use or collection of 
particular information, and an employer merely viewing the information 
on their own does not generate any tangible proof. 
 The Guidelines provides suggestions for employers who still wish 
to perform social networking background checks but do not want to risk 
running afoul of privacy legislation.  The suggestions are fairly 
straightforward and do not offer any real substantial advice beyond 
suggesting that employers be aware of their statutory obligations and be 
mindful to not try to circumvent them in a sneaky way.  It is my belief 
that this is a product of the fact that absent demanding a password, or 
an honest admission from the employer of what exactly they saw and 
how it factored into the hiring decision (something no mindful employer 
would do), current privacy and human rights legislation are practically 
ineffective regulators of the pre-employment social networking 




and nature of social networking background checks, they do not 
adequately take into account consent issues, their collection standard of 
“reasonableness” is insufficient in terms of direction, and, as a result, 
their practical impact is neither responsive to nor regulative of the 






















CHAPTER 6 Application of Current Law to the 
Employment Phase 
  
As is the case with the pre-employment phase, employers are 
increasingly incorporating the practice of creeping on the social 
networking activity of current employees.  When examining social 
networking activity, it is possible for countless situations to occur that 
give rise to employment law issues.  In examining the activity alone 
(without considering the different nature of social networking activity 
as opposed to activity in the physical world) first principles of 
employment law can be, and are, applied to address these situations.  In 
Canadian employment law, an employee can only be terminated if there 
is just cause, or if the employee is given reasonable notice (or payment 
in lieu of that notice).207  When it comes to application of first principles 
of employment law to dismissals as a result of social networking (or 
more general computer-use) activity, the question becomes whether the 
online activity of the employee constitutes just cause for dismissal or 
discipline.  An examination of the current application of employment 
law to issues arising from social networking activity follows. 
6.1 EMPLOYEE MONITORING IN THE WORKPLACE 
 When an employee is at work, the employer has a vested interest 
                                                
207 Geoffrey England et al, “Employment” Halsbury’s Laws of Canada 




in the way in which the employee is spending his or her time.  As such, 
it is important for an employer to be able to ascertain what an employee 
is doing during working hours.  This right of an employer to monitor the 
at-work activities of an employee has been legally explored.  The general 
rule is that employers do have a right to monitor the activity of 
employees; however, the real question is the extent and method the 
employer can use to monitor the activity of employees.  At issue in one 
labour arbitration was the extent to which an employer could use video 
cameras to monitor employees while at work.208  While the arbitrator in 
this case wrote that cameras present a technology to employers that 
allow them to be constantly supervising the activity of employees, the 
arbitrator also stressed that an employer’s ability to use such 
technology must be balanced against the employees’ legitimate interest 
in not being constantly surveilled; in assessing that balance, the 
arbitrator looked at the seriousness of the problem being addressed, the 
effectiveness of the cameras in addressing that problem, and the 
availability of other methods to address the problem.209  In this case, the 
collective agreement gave management the right “to make, alter and 
enfore, from time to time, rules and regulations, policies and practices, 
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to be observed by its employees.”210  Taking this into account, the 
arbitrator found that the employer had a right to install cameras at 
strategic points (i.e. entrances and exits), but not at all places where the 
employees worked.   
While there exist cameras that are so small they can go 
undetected, for the most part, if there is a camera watching your 
activity, you are aware of the camera’s presence.  Certain other forms of 
monitoring can easily go undetected, and thus, can be implemented 
without any form of consent or knowledge on the part of the employee.  
In employment law, it has been found that to secretly audiotape what 
goes on in the workplace is improper; however, it was found that in 
order to correct this practice, the employer need only inform the 
employee that such audiotaping is occurring.211  Similarly, under the 
Criminal Code212, a person is prohibited from using an electromagnetic, 
acoustic, mechanical, or other device to intercept a private 
communication (which is defined as communication made under 
circumstances in which it is reasonable for the originator to expect that 
it will not be intercepted by any person other than the intended 
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recipient213); however, as is the case in Employment Law principles, this 
does not apply where there exists express consent from the originator or 
recipient of the communication.214 
6.2 MONITORING OF AT-WORK COMPUTER ACTIVITY 
With technology progressing the way it is and becoming more 
intertwined with our daily lives, employees are spending more and more 
time online (whether it be for work purposes, or for personal purposes).  
As a result, the issue of an employee giving his or her employer his or 
her full time and attention becomes more at issue than it has been in 
the past.  In this context, what is meant by ‘full time and attention’ is 
that during an employee’s working hours, he or she will devote all of her 
attention and energy into the responsibilities for which he or she is 
employed, and avoid engaging in activities that are unrelated to work or 
wholly personal in nature215.  For some jobs, social networking activity 
is part of an employee’s responsibilities; however, for most, it is not.216  
While this issue is not unique to social networking (it applies equally to 
general internet-surfing and phone use, for example), the personal 
nature and frequency of social networking use raises specific concerns to 
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employers with regard to an employee’s full time and attention.  
Excessive use of the Internet and social networking for personal web 
surfing has resulted in suspensions,217 and even dismissals218 of 
employees.  Generally, however, excessive online activity has not been 
held to constitute time-theft.  Time-theft is considered to arise when 
there is an element of fraud to the act (i.e. getting a co-worker to punch 
a time-card on your behalf).219  While spending working hours surfing 
the internet or navigating Facebook for lengthy periods every day when 
it clearly is not a part of an employees job is, without a doubt, working-
time spent doing something that is not part of the employment contract, 
the level of discipline that is considered appropriate for such activity 
seems to exist on a continuum, depending on the surrounding 
circumstances (e.g. content of the websites accessed, whether the 
employee had other things to do, frequency of the activity, etc.).  The 
                                                
217 See Health Sciences Association of British Columbia v Fraser Health 
Authority (Surrey Memorial Hospital) [2011] BCCAAA No 125 (Glass) 
where a hospital employee who engaged in excessive Facebook and 
internet-use at work was given a 15-day suspension; and FA v Deputy 
Head (Department of Citizenship and Immigration) 2011 PSLRB 100 
[Andrews Grievance] (Rogers) where a public service employee was 
given a lengthy two year unpaid suspension. 
218 See Ontario Public Service Employees Union v Ontario (Ministry of 
Community and Social Services) [2011] OGSBA No 167 (Johnson) where 
two employees were dismissed for using work computers to moderate a 
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distinction here is that time-theft automatically leads to cause for 
dismissal, whereas excessive personal computer use does not 
necessarily. 
As a result of all of this, once again, an issue becomes the manner 
and extent to which an employer can monitor an employee’s computer 
activity.  Screen Capturing and Keystroke Logging programs can be 
very effective in terms of monitoring an employee’s activity on a 
computer.  These programs do essentially what their name implies.  
Keystroke Logging programs capture all of the keystrokes made on a 
particular program and screen capturing programs take random or 
triggered photos capturing all that is visible on a certain computer 
screen.  When there are keystroke logging or screen capturing programs 
installed on a computer or network of computers, unless the user is very 
computer savvy, there is no way of knowing that these programs are on 
the computer.  As such, an employer can install these programs without 
an employee having any idea that the programs exist and issues 
surrounding employee awareness and consent can easily be practically 
circumvented via this technology.  In this regard, a parallel can easily 
be drawn between monitoring an employee via audiotaping, and 
monitoring computer and social networking activity via computer 
program.  In light of the employment and criminal law consent 




social networking policies, or general internet-use policies as a part of 
employment contracts.  Sometimes these policies place a limitation on 
the extent to and purposes for which an employer can monitor computer 
use (i.e. virus protection, bandwidth monitoring, if there is reason to 
believe of a technical problem, troubleshooting, etc.), but it is possible 
for the policy to simply say that the employer either may or will monitor 
all activity that takes place on a work computer.  This way, employees 
are given notice and consenting to the fact that the employer is 
monitoring his or her online activity, and gives proof to the employer 
that the employee has consented to such monitoring – employers are 
free to ‘keep calm and creep on.’ 
Is this appropriate?  Not only is the validity of the consent in such 
a situation suspect, but while audiotaping and computer monitoring 
programs are similar in that they can go unnoticed (hence, a 
requirement of notice and consent), they are very different in terms of 
the potential content of what is being monitored.  Audiotaping at work 
has a very real, spatial connection to the workplace – the conversations 
occur in the workplace.  The computer, on the other hand, is different.  
While the computer is physically in the workplace, what happens on 
that computer in cyberspace does not necessarily have a content-related 
connection to work.  Oddly, much of the case law and legal literature 




the computer activity is rarely discussed.  The focus, rather, is on the 
application of current employment law as to whether what is discovered 
through the monitoring justifies dismissal or suspension.  A very 
important issue, the monitoring itself, is going unexamined. 
6.3 EMPLOYER CONCERNS REGARDLESS OF LOCATION 
 An employer’s interest in an employee’s activity is not limited to 
situations in which the activity in question occurs at the physical 
workplace.  Given the lack of physical space to the cyber-world, certain 
employment law issues can arise from social networking and internet 
use regardless of the physical space in which the employee is acting.  
The general rule here (for all conduct, not only internet-use) is that in 
making employment-related decisions, an employer can only consider 
the conduct of an employee when he or she is off-duty if that conduct in 
some way relates to the individual’s employment with that employer.220  
There are a few situations in which this is the case. 
 The first situation is when the conduct of an employee 
detrimentally affects the employer’s reputation.221  Given the 
instantaneous nature of social networking (and general internet) 
activity, and the potentially wide audience it can reach, reputations can 
be built and diminished in mere seconds.  One way an employee has 
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been found to detrimentally affect the employer’s reputation is to make 
public comments that explicitly criticize the employer.222  In the social 
networking context, if someone were to write a Facebook status to the 
effect of “What a terrible day at work.  I absolutely hate my employer 
and think he might be the most unfair, rude, and inconsiderate person I 
have ever had the displeasure of meeting.  It would bring joy to my 
heart if he dropped dead,” his or her employer, as a human being or 
business, has a legitimate interest in knowing that such comments were 
made, and if the employer found out the statement was made (for 
example, if the employer and the employee were Facebook friends) it is 
entirely possible that the employee could be fired for cause (i.e. 
insubordination).223  This very thing happened in Lougheed Imports Ltd. 
(West Coast Mazda) v. United Food and Commercial Workers 
International Union, Local 1518;224 two employees were discharged for 
posting very disrespectful, insulting, and offensive comments about 
their supervisors and managers on Facebook.   
However, not only comments directed at an employer can damage 
the reputation of the employer.  Whether an employer interest exists on 
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this basis is determined by considering whether the employer’s 
reputation is clearly damaged by the off-duty actions of an employee 
considering all of the surrounding circumstances.225  In making this 
connection, it is insufficient to show that the employer is well-known 
with an image to protect – the employee’s off-duty conduct must 
implicate the employer in some way and has to be such that continuing 
to employ the employee would sully the employer’s reputation.226  Also 
adding to the surrounding circumstances are factors relevant to the 
employee, like, for example, the position that the employee holds within 
the employer’s company. 
This can certainly occur online.  In EV Logistics v. Retail 
Wholesale Union, Local 580 (Discharge Grievance),227 for example, an 
employee identified his employer on his blog, but did not criticize that 
employer.  The subject matter of the blog, however, was the problem.  
On the blog, the employee posted many racist remarks and expressed 
adoration for Adolph Hitler and the Nazi Regime.  While the arbitrator 
noted that the blog was not directly aimed at the employer and found 
that termination was too severe a punishment, it was decided that 
because the blog mentioned the employer coupled with the nature of the 
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content of the blog, the employer had a right to discipline the employee 
regardless of the fact that the activity took place outside work. 
 Another situation in which off-duty conduct can relate to an 
individual’s employment is if the conduct adversely affects the 
employee’s ability to discharge his or her duties and responsibilities.228  
Consider, for example, an employee working in the health care sector.  
One of the duties of many employees working in the health care sector 
is to keep certain information confidential.  In such a situation, the 
employer has an interest in ensuring that the employee does not violate 
his or her obligation to keep that information confidential, because if 
that employee discloses confidential information to others, it is a 
violation of his or her duties and responsibilities regardless of the 
physical location in which such disclosure took place.  This type of 
violation can very easily occur online.  In one case,229 the employee, a 
personal care giver at a nursing home, set up a blog where she 
published text, pictures and comments about various residents of the 
nursing home without their consent.  While the blog was written on the 
employee’s own time, the employee argued that the comments made 
were akin to what employees normally discuss during break times and 
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was not out of the ordinary; however, the arbitrator, pointing to the fact 
that the employee had signed a confidentiality agreement and that the 
blog was accessible to anyone with an internet connection, rejected that 
argument and ruled that the employee’s termination be upheld – the 
employee’s online conduct was in violation of her and the employer’s 
duty of confidentiality. 
 The final situation in which an employee’s off-duty conduct has 
been found to affect his or her employment is if the conduct affects the 
employment rights of other employees.230  Something that fits squarely 
within this category is harassment among coworkers.  Employers also 
have a statutory interest in monitoring this type of activity.  Under the 
Ontario Human Rights Code,231 employers have a obligation to respond 
to discrimination or harassment in relation to a prohibited ground, and 
under Ontario’s Occupational Health and Safety Act,232 employers are 
required to address workplace violence and harassment by proactively 
implementing policies, training programs, and identifying problem 
employees.   
With social networking, conversations that were once held 
privately around the water-cooler are now spread online233, adding 
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elements of physical disconnect between the parties and instantaneity 
in the dissemination of gossip.  As a result, employers have a legitimate 
interest in knowing when this type of activity is happening among co-
workers, regardless of the fact that it is taking place online, rather than 
in the physical workplace. 
 Alberta Distillers Ltd. v. United Food and Commercial Workers, 
Local 1118234 illustrates how workplace harassment can occur online.  
In this case, one employee (Conrad) complained to the employer that 
she had been the victim of malicious comments by another employee 
(Carlson) on a third employee’s (Whiteside) Facebook wall.  As a result, 
the employer investigated the matter and decided, in light of his 
obligation to provide a harassment-free workplace, to terminate 
Whiteside.  However, there is a revealing wrinkle in this case.  The 
malicious posts, while they existed on Whiteside’s Facebook wall, were 
written by Carlson – Whiteside had not commented on the post or 
displayed any approval of the content of the wall post beyond not 
deleting the post.  As a result, it was ordered that there was no cause 
for discipline, and that Whiteside be reinstated with backpay.  However, 
what this shows is that not only can workplace harassment issues and 
subsequent terminations arise as a result of social networking activity, 
but also that confusion can ensue and wrong decisions can easily be 
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made when an issue does arise via social networking activity, and the 
decision-maker does not fully understand how exactly social networking 
operates. 
 Indeed, as can be seen from all of the aforementioned examples, 
there are numerous reasons, legal and otherwise, for an employer to 
concern himself or herself with what an employee is doing on social 
networking sites even when that activity takes place during non-
working hours.  This is a given – this is acknowledged.  However, this is 
not what I consider to be the real issue when it comes to social 
networking activity and its effects on the workplace.  The real issue 
here is whether, and to what extent, does the employer have a right to 
access and monitor the employee’s social networking activity.  Or, put 
another way, what kind of privacy right should the law afford an 
employee when it comes to keeping his or her social networking content 
away from the creeping eyes of his or her employer? 
 One decision that explored this very issue235 was a privacy 
complaint in Alberta.  In this case, the Calgary Police Service (a public 
body) was monitoring an employee’s work email activity as a result of a 
complaint from coworkers including allegations of inappropriate sexual 
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conduct.236  At issue was not really whether the public body’s 
monitoring of the employee’s work email was permissible under the 
circumstances; what was at issue was the public body’s use of something 
that was found in the email.  In the employee’s work email, there was a 
message that indicated the login information and password for the 
employee’s personal email.237  The employer used this information to 
access the employee’s personal email and therein found photographs of 
a sexual nature that appeared to have been taken at the workplace; 
these photos were used in the public body’s decision to terminate the 
employee, and were also used in the subsequent grievance process.238  
The employee made a complaint to the Privacy Commissioner that the 
use of this information was in contravention of Alberta’s Freedom of 
Information and Protection of Privacy Act.239  The adjudicator found 
that the collection of the personal information from the work email were 
not a violation of the Act, but the use of the login information and 
password (which led to the collection of the pictures) was in violation 
the Act, as logging into the employee’s personal email account was 
exceptionally invasive, and not necessary for the public body to carry on 
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its purposes in a reasonable manner (as is required under the Act).240  
While this appears to suggest that employers cannot access the personal 
email password and inbox of an employee, there are a few 
particularities about this case that should be noted.  First, in her 
decision, the adjudicator suggests that had the employee been accessing 
the personal email address at work, the result may have been 
different.241  Second, as the employer in this case was a public body, the 
relevant legislation was Alberta’s FOIPA, rather that PIPA.  As 
discussed in Chapter 4, the standards for collection of personal 
information are much more stringent in the public sector than the 
private sector, especially for information that is classified as “personal 
employee information,” as the information in this case would have been.  
Even worse, had this employee been working in a provincially regulated 
industry in one of the jurisdictions with no applicable privacy 
legislation, the employee’s personal information would have had no 
statutory privacy protection whatsoever (besides the tort of “intrusion 
upon seclusion”).  Finally, it is important to note that the employer was 
attempting to use the information collected in an official capacity – the 
employer was trying to use the photographs obtained as grounds for 
termination of the employee.  This puts the photographs under direct 
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scrutiny of the legislation, whereas if the employer had simply noted 
that the photographs existed and proceeded to treat that employee 
accordingly (i.e. waited for another reason for termination, not promoted 
as a result, etc.), the collection and use of these photographs would not 
have been under the scrutiny of the Act. 
 Beyond this case, the vast majority of the case law and legal 
literature concerning social networking activity during the employment 
relationship is much different from that with respect to the pre-
employment phase.  As was seen with the pre-employment phase, the 
big issue was the extent to which an employer could access a candidate’s 
social networking activity – this is not-so-much the case with legal 
issues arising out of social networking activity of someone who at the 
time of the activity is under an employment contract with a specific 
employer.  For example, in one case, a postal clerk with 31 years of 
service was dismissed as a result of certain insubordinate postings on 
her Facebook account.242  The supervisor in this case was informed by 
another letter carrier that some employees were spreading rumours and 
writing inappropriate things about supervisors on Facebook.243  The 
supervisor logged into Facebook under the account of a friend to protect 
his identity (something that is directly against Facebook’s user 
agreement), and searched for employees who he felt were the 
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“disruptive” employees (i.e. the ones who he thought would be likely to 
write such things).244  In doing so, he found the postings at issue in this 
case.  However, the activity of the supervisor (logging into someone 
else’s account and accessing the employee’s Facebook page) was only 
mentioned in passing.  The issues discussed and analyzed in the case 
were the contents of the postings, and whether they constituted grounds 
for dismissal – not whether it was appropriate for the supervisor to 
access the employer’s social networking information the way he did.  
While the supervisor was not himself breaching any of Facebook’s 
regulations, the way in which he accessed the posts does raise some 
concerns that I think should have been addressed.  Unfortunately, the 
only real issue explored in cases and legal literature with respect to 
social networking activity in the workplace is the determination of 
whether the employee’s activity is cause for dismissal or discipline, and 
not whether the employer should be able to monitor the social 
networking activity of the employee at all.   
There is something strange about all of this.  At the pre-
employment phase, employers seem to come off as aggressively 
pursuing a candidate’s social networking information.  There are media 
reports of employers asking for a candidate’s Facebook login 
information, warnings from Privacy Commissioner’s Offices about such 
                                                




activity, and legal blog posts exploring the legality of these types of 
practices.  However, once the employment relationship is established, 
employers do not seem to be so aggressive – with the exception of the 
Calgary Police case mentioned above, there are very few cases where 
the employer seems to be snooping into an employee’s personal online 
information.  Between the time where an individual was a candidate 
and where that individual becomes an employee, something significant 
seems to have changed with respect to the employer’s overt interest in 
the person’s social networking activity.  Why?   
It could be that the employer’s approach is to be very thorough in 
its social networking exploration during the hiring process, and then 
trust that the right decision was made so much that he or she no longer 
has any interest in monitoring the employee’s social networking 
activity.  While this is possible, and could be the case for some 
employers, it seems a bit simple to think that this is the approach taken 
by most employers.  If the employer is interested in a potential 
employee’s social networking activity before the employment phase 
commences, given the plethora of situations in which an employer has 
an interest in an employee’s social networking activity discussed above, 
it seems only logical that that employer would be just as, if not more 
interested in the employee’s social networking activity once the 




I contend that employers are still as interested, if not more 
interested in an employee’s social networking activity as they are at the 
pre-employment phase; however, the dynamics of the situation allow 
employers to creep the employee’s activity with more secrecy.  During 
the pre-employment phase, in order for an employer to access a 
candidate’s social networking information, their only practical way of 
doing so is to ask the candidate directly for said access (either by asking 
for login information, asking to become the candidate’s “friend,” or 
asking that the candidate login to a computer so the employer can 
browse the candidate’s social networking account).  Certain candidates 
have complained of this practice and there has been resulting legal 
response (legal blogs, Privacy Commissioner Guidelines and Human 
Rights Commissioner statements).  Once the candidate becomes an 
employee, however, the way an employer can access social networking 
information changes.  Employers have the ability to use technology to 
monitor the employee’s online activity.  As previously mentioned, 
through Keystroke Logging and Screen Capturing programs, an 
employer is able to monitor what an employee does on the computer 
without being detected.  Or in a less invasive manner, an employer can 
even look through an employee’s work email or web-browsing history 
without the use of any special program.  The lack of overtness to this 




such monitoring during the employment relationship – employees do 
not necessarily know it is happening.  Furthermore, the lack of 
employment standards protection afforded to candidates at the pre-
employment phase provides further insight into this discrepancy.  If an 
employer, as a result of looking at a candidate’s social networking 
activity decides that he or she does not want to hire the candidate, the 
employer can simply state that they felt someone else was a better fit, or 
some other reason to explain their hiring decision (whether it is true or 
not).  Employers are not under any real obligation to be honest, or cite 
an objectively valid, legislated reason for choosing to not hire someone.  
During the employment phase, if an employer wishes to terminate 
someone, the employer needs to show that there is just cause for doing 
so, or give reasonable notice (or payment in lieu of notice).  As a result, 
if an employer creeps an employee’s social networking activity and finds 
something distasteful, the employer is not permitted to terminate the 
employee as a result of what he or she has found unless the findings are 
sufficient cause for dismissal.  This explains why the cases emerging 
involving an employer monitoring an employee’s social networking 
activity are primarily those where the real analysis is whether the 
conduct justifies dismissal or discipline – it is only situations in which 
the employer is using the social networking activity in an official 




employers can easily monitor the online activity of his or her employees, 
take mental note of the activity, and proceed to treat the employee 
accordingly using what was seen in an unofficial capacity (i.e. not really 
consider them for a promotion, wait for any other excuse for discipline 
or termination, etc.). 
As a result of all of the factors mentioned in the paragraph above, 
it is my belief that the small number of cases where an employer is 
known to have monitored social networking of current employees is 
probably not representative of the extent of creeping that is actually 
going on.  Consequently, the fact that there is such a small number of 
cases where an employer is known to be monitoring the social 
networking of current employees seems to contribute to the lack of 
recognition of the the seriousness of the privacy issues at stake when 
such creeping occurs.   
When it comes to privacy legislation, the exact same problems 
that exist during the pre-employment phase exist during the 
employment phase.  Even if the employee gives consent for his or her 
employer to view his or her social networking activity, there are issues 
as to whether that consent is reliable or merely a product of the 
bargaining power of the two parties; furthermore, third-party consent 
and the resulting privacy problems is still a major issue that is 




The collection standard of what is ‘reasonable’ is very vague, and 
without voluntary disclosure from the employer of what was ‘collected,’ 
the practical nature of viewing online activity is more akin to viewing 
than collecting, as an employer needs only see the information to make 
unofficial use of it, rather than printing the information and physically 
collecting it.  And finally, when it comes to information contained on 
social networking sites, there are major questions surrounding accuracy 
and reliability of the information. 
 What this all amounts to is that there are many problems when it 
comes to protecting an individual’s privacy interest in his or her social 
networking information.  It is my position that this is because we are 
conceptualizing the way in which we protect social networking 
information incorrectly.  As a result of this misconceptualization, the 
mechanisms we employ to actually protect the information is frought 
with holes and deficiences.  In Chapter 7, I will explain New Virtualism, 
which I believe offers insight into how we should conceptualize the 
protection of social networking information.  It is my position that once 
this conceptualization is accepted, the degree to and way in which we 








CHAPTER 7 New Virtualism Explained 
 One approach to the regulation of online activity is to simply 
apply the law of the physical world to the online world without much 
consideration of the different nature of the two spaces.  This appears to 
be what is happening in the context of employment law issues when it 
comes to the use of social networking – first generation employment law 
principles are applied to situations without any real contemplation of 
the idea that there is a different nature to activity that takes place in 
the online world than activity that takes place in the physical world.  
When it comes to privacy, the law views the information generated by 
an individual’s online activity as a kind of physical “thing” in which the 
individual, by virtue of his or her connection to that thing, has some sort 
of property interest.  This is what is referred to as an “externalist” 
approach, and it will be discussed in more detail later in this Chapter.  
For now, I want to say that I do not think an externalist approach is 
adequate or appropriate. I believe that an emerging body of scholarship 
called “New Virtualism” provides a sounder theoretical basis upon 
which legal issues arising from social networking use should be based.  
Drawing upon certain core principles of past Virtualist245 theories that 
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did not work out, New Virtualism finds a balance between certain 
aspects of early cyberlaw theories and new practical legal realities with 
respect to the way in which contemporary internet use is affecting the 
way we live in the physical world.  An exploration of the origins of New 
Virtualism, as well as its virtues, follows. 
 The first generation of cyberlaw scholarship, Virtualism, came 
about when the internet was still young and not used nearly to the 
extent to which it is today.  The foundational idea behind Virtualism 
was the “Uniqueness Thesis”.  The Uniqueness Thesis acknowledged 
that the online world was a completely new and unique place that was 
of a much different nature than the physical world.246  The physical 
world and the online world were conceived of as being two completely 
distinct spaces, with clear-cut territorial borders.247  From this idea 
emerged the belief that because of its different territorial space and lack 
of physicality, the ‘space’ that is the online world should, and would be 
free from any external governmental control of influence – it dismissed 
real space concerns from the conversation when it came to 
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cyberspace.248  This is what was known as the “Legal Immunity Thesis”.  
John Perry Barlow’s A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace is 
a clear example of the way in which early cyberspace scholars shunned 
the idea of legal regulation of the virtual world.249  However, when 
Barlow’s Declaration was written, the internet was in its infancy and 
used in a way that had little to no direct impact on the physical world.  
Since then, the way in which the internet is used has changed 
drastically.  We need only look at the fact that real-money trade occurs 
online to demonstrate that the borders are not-so distinct; commercial 
transactions that occur online have corresponding real-world elements, 
obligations, and regulations.250  As a result of this changing nature of 
the use of the internet, it became vulnerable to traditional forms of 
control from physical world forces.  There is most definitely government 
regulation and lawmaking with respect to that which goes on in the 
online world – it is far from immune to outside influence.  It is now 
apparent that the hopes and visions of those who advocated for online 
legal immunity did not work out.  
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 New Virtualism, while acknowledging that the original 
Virtualists were incorrect about the online world’s legal immunity, 
contend that there are still lessons to be learned from the original 
Virtualists, as “the Virtualist intellectual paradigm was never really 
about law or politics, at least not directly.  Rather, it was about the 
fundamental nature of cyberspaces and virtual worlds themselves.”251 
New Virtualism contends that just because the Legal Immunity Theory 
was incorrect does not mean that the Uniqueness Thesis upon which the 
Virtualists based the Legal Immunity Thesis cannot provide a solid 
foundation upon which approaches to legal regulation of online activity 
should be based.252  It is for this reason that the theory is called “New” 
Virtualism – it embraces the Virtualist idea that the uniqueness of 
cyberspace poses challenges to law and policy that need to be 
approached differently than real space challenges; however, it is “New” 
in the sense that it goes beyond the utopian ideas of the Legal Immunity 
Thesis, and approaches the challenges posed to real space and 
cyberspace together, acknowledging the importance, coexistence, and 
interdependence of the two worlds.253 
 What innovations does this new theory offer?  In the article 
Understanding the New Virtualist Paradigm, Jonathon Penney writes 
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that “the best way to understand the New Virtualism is to compare it 
with the intellectual product of the first generation cyberlaw scholars – 
the original Virtualists.”254  In doing so, Penney sets out the following 
three key features or innovations that are found in New Virtualism 
theory that were not a part of the original Virtualist theory – 
innovations that are more responsive to and appropriate for the way in 
which the internet is being used in contemporary society: “first, its 
recognition of the permeability of real and virtual space; second, its 
reliance on the interdependence of cyberlaw analytical perspective; and 
third, its rejection of the cyber-utopians Legal Immunity Thesis.”255 
7.1 THE PERMEABILITY OF REAL AND PERSONAL SPACES 
 Original Virtualists were of the opinion that cyberspace was 
defined by clearly marked boundaries that made it physically separate 
from real space.256  Virtualists believed that these borders between real 
space and cyberspace (in the forms of screens and passwords) were 
hard, clear, and defined – they created territorial boundaries that 
completely separated the two worlds.257  As a result, the idea that real 
world laws and norms would apply to the cyber world was not 
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conceivable to the original Virtualists – the two spaces were thought to 
be impermeable.258 
 Over time, however, as a result of the changing nature of the way 
in which people use the internet, the original Virtualists idea of a clear 
border turned out to be wrong.   
“…borders between real space and cyberspace were neither clear 
nor impermeable.  Increasing public use and popularity of the 
Internet and its cyberspaces and virtual worlds, brought more 
attention and scrutiny from ‘real space’ state regulators and law 
enforcement officials.  New laws were proposed and new means 
of controlling this supposed ‘new frontier’ of cyberspace were 
propagated and enforced, reaching into the presumably 
impenetrable borders of cyberspace.  Increasing electronic 
commerce and commodification also played a role in blurring 
borders between cyber and real space.  As business moved more 
of their commerce online, they sought new ways to track and 
influence consumer habits and preferences; that is, they brought 
traditional business ideas into the cyber world.  The hard and 
clear borders of cyberspace were not so, and the cyberlaw 
proposals of the original Virtualists, based on this false 
assumption, were cast into doubt with these important 
changes.”259 
 
New Virtualism, unlike the original Virtualism, acknowledges and 
embraces these uncertain borders between the physical world and the 
online world.260  In doing so, New Virtualists do not need to ignore the 
fact that the goings on in the online world and the goings on in the real 
world are interrelated and interdependent; as a result, New Virtualists 
are in a better position than Virtualists to understand what effect 
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traditional laws should and will have on the norms of virtual spaces, 
and vice-versa.261  This acknowledgement is altogether different from 
that of the original Virtualists.  It does not conceive of the cyber world 
as being a clear-cut space, completely removed from the physical world 
– this is a crucial difference between the way in which Virtualism and 
New Virtualism conceive of the proper regulation of activity that occurs 
online.  New Virtualism is more in tune with contemporary internet 
use.  
7.2 RECOGNIZING THE IMPORTANCE AND INTERDEPENDENCE OF 
PERSPECTIVE 
 
 The problem of perspective in approaching the legal regulation of 
online activity has been described as a conflict between “internal” and 
“external” viewpoints.262  New Virtualism’s understanding of the 
borders between cyberspace and real space as not being clearly defined, 
but rather as interrelated and interdependent gives New Virtualism a 
perspective for analysis that was missing in the original Virtualist 
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theory of online regulation and allows for a more appropriate analysis 
that cannot be done from a wholly externalist perspective.263 
 Internal perspectives analyze something from the perspective of a 
‘person’ who is living within a cyberspace or virtual community.264  As 
can be seen in Barlow’s Declaration, the original Virtualists, because 
they saw the online world as a clearly defined space with territorial 
boundaries, embraced an internal perspective when it came to the 
regulation of online activity.265  The external perspective, as previously 
mentioned, advocates for the use of the laws and regulations of the 
physical world, and merely applying them to the online world as if it 
exists in the physical world.266  The external perspective was not used in 
any way by original Virtualists; it was seen as being appropriate for 
that “other place” (the physical world) that was completely removed and 
distinct from the cyber world – consequently, its norms and rules were 
considered inappropriate.267 
 The reality is that virtual people are in a very real way associated 
with real people, and virtual communities are designed by people who 
live in the physical world.268  While this was not the case during the 
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Virtualist era, it is now the reality.  As a result, New Virtualism values 
a balance between the internalist and the externalist perspectives.  New 
Virtualist scholarship remains Virtualist in the sense that it 
understands the value that an internalist perspective can offer, but it 
also understands that an external perspective, as it can provide 
important insight, is not to be ignored.269  According to New Virtualism, 
both the internal and external perspectives, the virtual and physical, 
are now relevant, necessary, and interrelated; as a result, it is more 
practical, applicable to the present state of internet use, and more 
flexible than a wholly internalist or wholly externalist perspective 
alone.270 
7.3 REJECTING THE LEGAL IMMUNITY THESIS 
 Flowing naturally from the premises discussed earlier – the 
permeability of the borders of real and virtual space – it is clear that 
New Virtualism cannot accept a perspective that is wholly internalist.271  
However, the rejection of the assertion that external laws should play 
no part in the virtual world does not mean that the internalist 
perspective is dismissed.  While the recognition of interrelated 
boundaries implicitly rejects the Legal Immunity Thesis, it “also rejects 
the thesis of cyberlaw skeptics who see nothing interesting, unique, or 
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new [about the regulation of online activity], or that [the cyber world] is 
non-existent.”272  Taking real life concerns into account is an 
acknowledgement that the same people live in the real world and in the 
virtual world, but it is not an abandoning of the idea that online activity 
should not be thought of differently than activity in the physical world; 
it is simply a recognition of the practical reality that the online world 
and the physical world are interdependent.273  The end result is that 
New Virtualism calls for laws that are both sensitive to the unique 
nature of the virtual world, and cognizant of the fact that the virtual 
world is not a completely separate world that exists in complete 
isolation from the physical world; the original Virtualists were wrong to 
completely reject externalism, but to ignore the values of an internalist 
perspective would be just as misguided when it comes to making sound 
choices in policy and law when it comes to the regulation of activity that 
takes place in the online world. 
7.4 PRIVACY IN NEW VIRTUALISM 
 As mentioned in Chapter 2, privacy is difficult to conceptualize.  
It has been said that the concept of privacy is in disarray, as it appears 
to be about everything, and therefore, about nothing.274  As can be seen 
                                                
272 Understanding the New Virtualist Paradigm, ibid at 9. 
273 Understanding the New Virtualist Paradigm, ibid at 9. 





in Chapters 5 and 6, the advancement of technology and the changing 
nature of the use of technology presents new difficulties to an 
individual’s privacy interests and, more generally, to conceptualizing 
what exactly privacy protects. 
7.5 INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY: A PROBLEM 
 The subject matter of privacy concerns with respect to online 
activity and personal information found online has generally been 
classified as “informational privacy.”275  While it is difficult to 
conceptualize what exactly is meant by informational privacy, the 
Supreme Court of Canada has defined informational privacy, as opposed 
to personal privacy or territorial privacy as follows: “the claim of 
individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, 
how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to 
others.”276  Most legal scholars have approached informational privacy 
as a form of property interest, in that people should be able to control 
their online personal information because they have a property right in 
that information.277  As was mentioned in Chapter 4, this was the type 
of privacy interest Justice Sharpe said was at stake in Jones v Tsige. 
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According to New Virtualist principles, this categorization of 
“informational privacy,’ as a form of property is misguided.  The 
categorization of privacy renders the conceptualization of privacy even 
more convoluted than it already is.278  Not only this, but to view 
someone’s online information as property is looking at online activity 
from a wholly externalist point of view.  In real space, when thinking of 
physical documents in a person’s possession it makes sense to 
distinguish between an individual’s right in privacy to make decisions 
and determinations with respect to his or her physical person and a 
person’s more so property-related right to determine whether to disclose 
the information contained in those physical documents as he or she 
pleases.  The former has to do with decision-making for the self, 
whereas the second is more so about controlling a “thing” that contains 
information about the person.  To think of someone’s online information 
as a “thing” over which they have proprietary control with respect to the 
disclosure or non-disclosure of that information is to think about the 
information as being the product of a real person sitting at his or her 
keyboard in physical space, external to the virtual space.  But if one is 
to think of online information from an internalist perspective, if we 
think of the person as if they are choosing, moving, and negotiating 
within the virtual space, the distinction between a property interest in 
                                                




information and the right to make decisions for the self blurs – in the 
online space, the information is what makes up the person.279  As was 
written in Chapter 2, privacy is important because it allows people the 
‘space’ necessary to achieve their personhood.  As a result, rather than 
theorizing about under which categorization of privacy online 
information should be classified, New Virtualism asserts that in order 
to have a more appropriate understanding of what type of privacy 
protection online information should be given, it is more important to 
fully understand the nature of personhood in cyberspace. 
7.6 PERSONHOOD IN CYBERSPACE 
 In real space, a person’s body is easily defined through physical 
limits, and that together the “information” inside that person’s body (i.e. 
experiences, thoughts, morals, etc.) make up the individual.  This 
“information” that is inside the person is not protected via 
“informational” privacy protection, it is protected and respected because 
it is viewed as being constitutive of an individual’s personhood.  Unlike 
in real space, where a person’s body is discerned and defined through 
the physically fixed limits, the virtual person is embodied through 
information; the information is not the property of the person – the 
information is the person.280  Online information is not a “thing;” rather, 
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“digital technology enables the preservation of the minutia of our 
everyday comings and goings, of our likes and dislikes, of who we are 
and what we own…a life captured in records, a digital person…”281  
“Our identities, personal preferences, interests, relationships (online 
and offline), health, hobbies, and work are embodied in the information 
volunteered by us online, or collected about us through our daily 
sojourns in virtual worlds [and] electronic landscapes.”282  What is put 
onto social networking sites, according to New Virtualism, is not just 
information, but rather a capturing of certain elements of our selves – 
the information makes up a virtual person.  This is not to say that the 
virtual self is completely cut off from the physical self; rather, the two 
are intimately linked – the virtual person implicates many aspects of 
our physical being in real space.283  For this reason, according to New 
Virtualist principles, the embodied information that makes up a 
person’s virtual self should not be seen as property of the physical self 
when it comes to privacy protection.  Rather, there are two bodies – the 
one in real space constituted by our physical bodies (which includes our 
thoughts, emotions, mind, etc.), and the one in cyberspace constituted 
by information – according to New Virtualistm, these two “bodies,” 
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together, to make up an individual’s sense of self and personhood.284  
This is the basis upon which a person’s privacy interest in this 
information should be protected. 
This is especially appropriate when it comes to social networking 
information in the employment relationship.  If we conceptualize this 
information as a “thing” over which an individual has a property right, 
there is a corresponding likelihood that a person may forfeit an element 
of that property right through a contract.  This is what happens when 
there are workplace social networking or internet-use policies that state 
that an employer may monitor all of an employee’s computer activity.  
As was discussed in Chapter 2, one of the key aspects of employment 
law is to ensure that the freedom of contract does not dominate 
employment relations – we need to ensure that our societal core values 
are not compromised and commodified as a result of an inequality in 
bargaining power.  To think of an individual’s ability to control the 
audience of his or her social networking information as an element of 
personal autonomy rather than an exercise of property rights gives a 
clearer understanding of the extent to which an employer should be able 
to monitor an employee’s social networking information – this element 
of personal autonomy will not be surrendered by an employee as a 
commodity.   
                                                




Yet another reason I think it is necessary to think of social 
networking information differently from physical documents containing 
information is the fact that social networking information, by virtue of 
existing online, has the potential to be accessed very easily by the use of 
technology.  A diary, for example, is physically kept hidden away in a 
cupboard or drawer (and often locked).  The information on a social 
networking site is in no way physically protected.  As a result, it is of a 
different nature, and thus presents a different, more serious threat to 
an individual’s privacy. 
7.7 THE CONCEPTUAL ADVANTAGE 
 To link privacy to concepts like autonomy and decision-making 
for the virtual person is conceptually more simple than to create an 
additional type of privacy relating to information.285  While a New 
Virtualist concept of privacy for virtual persons requires by necessity 
privacy in information, it only does so because the virtual person is 
made up of that information; it requires only a theorization about 
“persons in cyberspace” – a contextualization of privacy, rather than a 
re-conceptualizing or re-categorization.   
 Think about it this way.  A physical person has certain elements 
of their life that they choose to share with others to varying degrees.  I 
group our personal information into three categories: (1) that which we 
                                                




wish to keep completely private; (2) that which we are willing to share 
with a certain group of people; and (3) that which we are open to 
sharing with the entire world.   
For the first category, we make a conscious decision to not share 
this information with anyone.  These are personal secrets that we keep 
inside our own head.  We are considered to have a right to keep private 
whatever is in our head that we do not wish to share with others.286  
While that which is in our mind is “information” in a sense, the 
protection that is given to our thoughts and memories is not considered 
to be protected under the categorization of “informational privacy;” 
rather, the idea that we can keep this information in our own head is 
more closely linked to values of personal autonomy and decision-
making, which constitutes an integral part of our personhood. 
For the second category of personal information, we share this 
information to a limited extent.  This information is shared with others 
under certain conditions.  We contour the degree to which we share this 
information based on the nature of the information itself and the nature 
of our relationship between oneself and the other person.  While we all 
acknowledge that the other person may ‘blab’ this information to others, 
we generally operate on an assumption that secrets will be kept – and if 
they are not, we contour what kind of information we share with that 
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person in the future.  This is just a part of life – anything we share with 
another person can possibly be repeated to others.  This information is 
not protected in any legal way287; however, there are physical 
limitations to the nature of conversations.  When we share this 
information orally, it is delivered in such a way that it can only be heard 
by those who are within earshot – our expectations of privacy when 
having a conversation in the physical world are shaped by our physical 
surroundings.  Similarly, if we share this information with a diary, for 
example, its potential for discovery by unwanted readers has physical 
limitations – the diary may be kept in a locked drawer in our home, 
which makes access physically difficult.  Once again, despite the fact 
that it is “information,” our ability to choose how we share this 
information is not conceived of as “informational privacy;” it is more 
truly rooted in the idea of personal autonomy. 
With respect to the third category of personal information, it is 
information that we are willing to share with all.  For example, if an 
individual lists his or her phone number and address in the phonebook, 
he or she is acknowledging that this information can be received by 
anyone who has access to a phonebook.  In the physical world, we 
sometimes make things known to all others who care to make even 
cursory explorations into finding this information – as a result, a person 
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has no real privacy interest in this information, but he or she does have 
the personal autonomy to choose whether to make such a public 
disclosure. 
Now, using the principles of New Virtualism, let us think about 
these levels of personal information as they are applied to physical 
people in the context of a virtual person who is made up of the 
information contained in an individual’s social networking account.  The 
information and activity contained in a person’s social networking 
account is the information making up an individual’s virtual person that 
is the subject of this work.  The pictures, statuses, profile information, 
page’s “liked,” etc., while in the form of “information,” pieced together 
work to create an online embodiment of a person. 
With respect to the information in the first category, this 
information would not be contained on a Facebook page.  It may be held 
somewhere in Facebook’s network (i.e. whose profile a person may be 
searching or accessing and how often), but information that one wishes 
to keep completely secret would not be accessible by any other user on 
Facebook.  Here, the information is basically the same as thoughts that 
stay within an individual’s mind in the physical world – the decision to 
not share this information with anyone should be respected as a matter 




The second category is information that is shared via the social 
network to some limited extent.  This can include anything from photos, 
statuses, wall posts, private messages, notes, etc.  Much like in the 
physical world, when we share this information with another person 
there is an inherent risk that this person may go on and share the 
information with other people, whether it be as an oral re-telling or 
copying and pasting the message or activity itself.  As mentioned above, 
in the physical world there are physical and spatial limitations that 
allow an individual to assess his or her surroundings when sharing 
information with another.  These types of physical limitations do not 
exist in the cyber world; however, using an internalist, New Virtualist 
perspective, one can see that social networking platforms like Facebook 
do have privacy settings and passwords that function in a way that is 
analogous to those spatial and physical limitations in the physical 
world.  As was discussed in Chapter 3, the intended audience for any 
information that is put on Facebook can vary depending on the 
individual’s privacy settings.  For example, if I feel like sharing with 
someone that I had a terrible day, I could share this information over 
Facebook in a multitude of ways that have varying degrees of privacy.  I 
could write a status for all of my friends to see; I could write a status 
that only certain friends could see; I could write a wall post on a friend’s 




message to someone specific (or a group of people), etc.  All of these 
activities have varying expectations of privacy based on the form of the 
communication and the privacy configurations of my Facebook account.  
There is still the risk that what is written can be relayed to others by 
the audience, but the privacy settings allow the user to control his or 
her audience in a way that is somewhat analogous to the way we use 
physical limitations to control our audience when sharing information 
in the physical world.  However, the seemingly endless possibilities that 
exist in the cyber space and the fact that our perceptions and 
understanding of degrees of online privacy are not physically sensed in 
the same way as they are in the physical world, there is an increased 
possibility of inadvertently sharing information with an unintended 
audience. 
The third category of information would be information that is 
contained on a Facebook page that can be viewed by anyone with access 
to Facebook.  There is no real expectation of privacy in this information. 
What New Virtualism does is provide a fairly straightforward 
analytical tool for how we should approach privacy issues in cyberspace.  
Rather than focusing on categorization of privacy interests or the 




experience of people in cyberspace, and how privacy ought to work in 
that context.288 
It is my position that this conceptualization of privacy in online 
social networking information would help to maximize the potential 
benefit we can receive from social networking.  If people would be free to 
use social networking in a pure form, without the worry of unwelcome 
audience members watching their every move, social networking 
becomes a very useful forum for people to socialize, learn from one 
another, and pursue a sense of identity and self-actualization.  As a 
result, I think that New Virtualism’s conception of how to approach 
privacy issues in cyberspace, with its recognition of social networking 
information constituting personhood, and the focus on personal 
autonomy as the basis for controlling who can access that information, 
provides a solid framework for how the issues discussed in Chapters 5 








                                                




CHAPTER 8 Application of New Virtualism 
 
 Chapter 5 of this work explored some of the issues with respect to 
employers requesting or demanding access (to differing degrees) to a job 
candidate’s social networking account.  Chapter 6 explored similar 
issues after the employment relationship is established.  This Chapter 
will see just how the New Virtualist principles of Chapter 7 would work 
to address the specific problems and issues that were discussed in 
Chapters 5 and 6. 
 First – a general comment.  Employers are not “villains.”  At 
times in this work it may seem that I have portrayed employers as 
people who are out to snoop around in their employees’ business – this 
is not at all what I am trying to say.  I would contend that many, if not 
most employers have absolutely no interest in looking through an 
employee’s social networking information.  However, with the 
institution of employment having large inequalities in economic, social, 
and legal power, I think that there is a temptation and incentive for 
employers to exploit their situation and infringe upon the rights of their 
employees.  For this reason, I think it is important to regulate the 
relationship, and an employer’s ability to consider an employee’s social 





 There were practical and legal issues discussed in Chapter 5 
when it comes to employers requesting or demanding289 access to a 
candidate’s social networking information.  As a job candidate only falls 
under the purview of Employment Standards legislation in very limited 
circumstances in two Canadian jurisdictions, the main legal issues that 
arise from social networking background checks are under human 
rights and privacy legislation.  Chapter 5 also discussed the following 
three levels of invasiveness when it comes to the collection of social 
networking information:  Password (highest level of invasiveness - 
where an employer requests the candidate’s login information so that he 
or she can go through the candidate’s personal account290); Public 
(lowest level of invasiveness – where an employer accesses that which 
any other Facebook user can access); In-Between (varying degrees of 
invasiveness – can be anywhere from requesting to be the candidate’s 
“Friend” on Facebook to requesting that the candidate login on a 
computer and watch as the employer navigates the candidate’s social 
networking site). 
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 With respect to the Password level of invasiveness, it is my 
opinion that this practice should be impermissible.  Using the New 
Virtualist perspective, the elements of an individual’s personhood that 
are accessible by logging into a person’s social networking account are 
potentially unlimited – not only could the reader find out in-depth 
information about a prohibited ground of discrimination under human 
rights law, but the reader can potentially access some of the most 
intimate and private aspects of an individual’s life imaginable.  Not only 
this, but there are numerous alternative ways an employer can access 
and address relevant elements of a candidate’s social networking 
information; the only reason a password could be required is if the 
employer is interested in prying into online personhood of the candidate 
to the most intrusive extent possible.  This is in some way analogous to 
an employer asking a candidate the most intimate and personal 
questions conceivable.  However, for the following reason I contend that 
it is even more inappropriate than that.  If an employer asks a 
candidate a question that is inappropriate (for example, if the employer 
asks the candidate his or her religious beliefs)291, should the candidate 
wish to file a human rights complaint, he or she would be able to point 
directly to the fact that the employer asked that question – by virtue of 
the question being uttered, the candidate is made aware that the 
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employer took the candidate’s religious beliefs into consideration.  When 
an employer has a candidate’s social networking password, he or she 
can peruse the candidate’s account without the candidate having any 
idea what information was accessed, whether it was considered, etc. – 
he or she is completely in the dark.  The degree to which unbridled 
social networking account access allows an employer to pry into the life 
of the employee is not appropriate, and the way in which the employer 
can look into the information privately allows for relatively easy 
circumvention of any protection afforded to candidates under human 
rights or privacy legislation.   
For these reasons, I believe that legislation like the proposed 
Private Member’s Bill292 in Nova Scotia should be implemented.  
However, the legislation should go beyond where the Nova Scotia Bill 
appears to go, and be more analogous to the protections afforded to job 
candidates in Ontario and New Brunswick with respect to lie detector 
tests.  The Nova Scotia Bill prohibits requiring a candidate’s social 
networking password – it is my belief that in order to have any practical 
effect, the Bill must go further and prevent employees from even 
requesting this type of access.  This final step is necessary because given 
the inequality in bargaining power that exists between an employer and 
a candidate, the candidate could consent to a request solely based on the 
                                                




dynamics of the situation and not because he or she is actually fine with 
someone prying into their life to that extent.  Finally, there is really no 
need for an employee to gain such in-depth access to a candidate’s 
personal affairs – any reasonable concerns an employer may have can 
be practically addressed in a much less intrusive manner. 
Yet another reason to not allow this kind of access is to respect 
the dynamics of the virtual community of Facebook and the people who 
are a part of that community.  As was mentioned in Chapter 3, it is 
against Facebook’s user agreement to allow another person to login to 
your Facebook account, and in Chapter 4 I made reference to a 
statement from Facebook’s Chief Privacy Officer where she spoke out 
specifically against employers requesting a job candidate’s login 
information.  Facebook users tailor their online activity based on who 
they have as their Friends and their privacy settings.  While users are 
aware that it is entirely possible for a friend to allow another to login to 
his or her account and view the user’s activity, if this were to become 
common practice, Facebook would lose any real sense of community and 
things like “Friends” and privacy settings would become useless – this is 
likely why Facebook has made such activity a violation of its user 
agreement.  A law prohibiting employers to login to a candidate’s social 




of social networking sites and allow them to conduct their activity in the 
online community with a sense of trust and self-determination. 
With respect to the Public level of invasiveness, the candidate is 
making this information known to anyone who wishes to look into it, 
and consequently, should not have any legally enforceable privacy 
interest in said information.  In accessing this information, there are 
certainly concerns on the employer’s part with respect to human rights 
and privacy legislation compliance; however, from the candidate’s 
perspective, he or she has chosen to make these elements of their life a 
part of the public domain.  This is not to say that an employer should be 
able to use this information in any way it sees fit (i.e. if the candidate’s 
public Facebook page reveals his or her religious beliefs, the employer 
should not be able to reject the person on that basis)293; however, when 
examining this type of social networking background check from an 
internalist or externalist perspective, I believe the result is 
substantially the same – if an employer wishes to access this 
information, the candidate, in making his or her Facebook page public 
has acquiesced to anyone with access to Facebook being able to view his 
or her page. 
A real concern here is the possibility of collecting inaccurate 
information.  For employers who fall under the purview of privacy 
                                                




legislation, there is a duty placed on the employer to inform the 
candidate of any collection of personal information prior to the 
collection, to ensure the accuracy of the information, and a requirement 
of direct collection.  As a result, I think the danger for collection of 
inaccurate information is mitigated; however, there still exists a large 
segment of employers whose activity does not fall under the purview of 
any privacy legislation.  In those jurisdictions there is a very real 
possibility of the collection of inaccurate information, as the candidate 
can be completely unaware that any social networking background 
check is being conducted. 
The In-Between level of invasiveness is where things get tricky.  
This is where the standards and requirements in privacy legislation are 
the most important.  As previously mentioned, the type of activity that 
would fall under this category are things like requesting to be a 
candidate’s Facebook Friend, or requesting that the candidate sign onto 
his or her Facebook account and navigate the site while the employer 
looks on.  With the former, the candidate has some control in the 
situation in that he or she can alter his or her privacy settings to allow 
the employer to see or not see whatever parts of his or her account that 
the candidate sees fit.  With the latter, while it is somewhat analogous 
to asking for a candidate’s password, it is different in that the candidate 




exactly which information is being accessed.  While the latter is 
potentially more invasive than the former depending what the employer 
asks to access, in either situation, the candidate knows exactly what the 
employer is able to see, alleviating the possibility of certain aspects of a 
candidate’s social networking account being used in the hiring process 
without the candidate even knowing whether the employer accessed 
said information. 
The real issue here, once again, is whether consent to either such 
exploration into a candidate’s social networking account is reliable as 
true consent or more just a product of the circumstance of vulnerability 
or inequality.  A way to alleviate this problem is to fix the standard for 
the circumstances in which a candidate’s social networking activity is 
deemed under privacy legislation to be collectible by an employer.  In 
the employment context, private sector privacy legislation has no 
requirement that the information collected be directly related to the 
position for which a candidate is being considered.  From an internalist 
perspective, this should absolutely be the standard for an employer 
delving into a candidate’s life in this way; if it is not directly related to 
the duties for which the employee is being hired, then, quite frankly, it 
is a part of the candidate’s life that is none of the employer’s business.  
It is not the same as biographical information, or information that can 




individual’s virtual self, and he or she should only be put under 
pressure to disclose this information in legitimate circumstances.  To 
request access to the information out of curiosity that is not directly 
related to the employment relationship should be considered 
inappropriate.  Now, if activity on social networking sites is part of the 
position for which the candidate is being considered, then it is 
completely reasonable for an employer to want to review the candidate’s 
activities and competency when it comes social networking.  Collection 
standards like those found in public sector privacy legislation – direct 
relation to the position – should be the norm across the board.  It is only 
in such a situation that asking a candidate to navigate his or her social 
networking page in front of the employer could be considered 
appropriate.  This way, the employer has a chance to review information 
that is relevant to the position for which the candidate is being 
considered, and it allows the candidate to be the person doing the 
“clicking,” allowing him or her to be aware of exactly which information 
the employer is asking to see – thus alleviating issues of proof when it 
comes to allegations of invasive collection of irrelevant information or a 
potential human rights complaint.  Furthermore, there should be a 
requirement that the employer notify the candidate prior to the 
interview this will be happening – this way, the candidate has an 




an opportunity to clean their home before having visitors).  This is not a 
stretch, nor is it unduly restrictive on employers – it is appropriately 
respectful of an individual’s personal information.  This should also 
inform what an employer should reasonably be expected to look into 
when it comes to a determination of negligence in the hiring process, as 
was discussed in Chapter 5.  Depending on the nature of the position 
(i.e. a position that incorporates social networking activity), it may be 
such that an employer should be expected to make explorations into the 
relevant social networking activity of the candidate; however, the 
expected extent of those explorations should be limited, and should 
certainly not go so far as to expect a background check with the 
Password level of invasiveness. 
I feel a need to clarify what was said above with respect to an 
employer requesting to be a candidate’s Facebook friend being 
acceptable in certain circumstances.  I do not believe there should be an 
outright ban on an employer requesting to be a candidate’s Facebook 
friend.  I think this is too restrictive – employers and job candidates 
should be permitted to be Facebook friends if they wish.294  However, 
the way in which the request is made is very important.  If, for example, 
there was mention during the interview process that the candidate 
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would be receiving a friend request in a way that implied there is some 
connection between the friend request and the job, then social 
networking information should have to be directly related to the job 
itself.  However, even if social networking is not directly related to the 
job and the candidate nonetheless feels some pressure to accept the 
friend request, he or she is still able to contour the privacy settings of 
the friendship in such a way that the employer can see little to none of 
the information the candidate has put on the site.295  If, however, a 
candidate were asked during an interview to accept a friend request 
from the employer on the spot, he or she would not have an opportunity 
to alter these privacy settings.  For this reason, I think such a practice 
should not be permitted – the candidate loses any sense of control of his 
or her privacy configuration of the Facebook friendship.  For this 
reason, whether an employer requesting to be a candidate’s Facebook 
friend is appropriate can vary depending on the surrounding 
circumstances. 
8.2 DURING WORKING HOURS 
 As was mentioned in Chapter 5, the increased use of social 
networking sites by employees presents issues for employers with 
respect to whether an employee is devoting his or her full time and 
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attention to his or her duties as an employee during working hours.  As 
a result, there are many approaches an employer can take to ensuring 
employees are not spending too much (or any) of their working hours on 
their personal social networking accounts.  An employer can install 
software on the computer that limits the types of web-pages employees 
can access, or a workplace internet use policy can be drafted and 
attached to all employment contracts outlining the way in which 
workplace computers are to be used.  The employer should be able to do 
what is necessary (via software or otherwise) to monitor compliance 
with workplace policies, but it should stop there.  Only when there is an 
enforced policy in place that states that computers are to be only and 
exclusively used for work purposes296 (and the actual workplace practice 
follows suit) should an employer be able to install software like Screen 
Capturing or Keystroke Logging programs.  Furthermore, if this is the 
case and the employee does consent to the installation of such programs, 
the employer should be limited to using these programs only to the 
extent that is necessary to ensure compliance with the workplace 
computer-use policy (i.e. to see whether an employee was on his or her 
social networking site for an extended period of time, and not to see 
what he or she was doing on the site).  The reality is that an employer 
                                                
296 Whether such a stringent policy should be acceptable at all is 
certainly a legitimate question; however, this question is beyond the 




does have a legitimate interest in how an employee spends his or her 
time during working hours; however, this should not grant the employer 
any right to pry into the personal affairs of an employee, even if the 
employee is dealing with those personal affairs at work.  As far as the 
employer’s interest in full time and attention goes, he or she should be 
able to be kept in the loop as to whether an employee is using social 
networking during working hours, but not kept in the loop as to what 
the employee is doing while on these social networking sites. 
 If an employee is using a workplace computer or network to 
browse the internet, the employer also has an interest in some costs or 
problems that can come along with such use (i.e. virus protection, 
bandwidth limits, etc.).  Generally, however, these problems do not 
present themselves by the use of social networking sites, but as is the 
case with ensuring employees give the employer his or her full time and 
attention, an employer should only be able to make cursory explorations 
into what an employee is browsing for troubleshooting purposes – not to 
simply peruse an employee’s online activity. 
8.3 GENERAL SOCIAL NETWORKING ACTIVITY 
 This is not to say that employers do not have any interest in what 
an employee is doing while on social networking sites – as was 




in an employee’s social networking activity regardless of the physical 
location in which the person is conducting said activity. 
 Workplace policies can be written with respect to how employees 
are to conduct themselves on social networking sites; however, once 
again, the real issue is the extent to which the employer should be able 
to monitor the employee’s social networking activity in the name of 
protecting those interests.  And while the aforementioned technological 
means for an employer to gain access to an employees social networking 
account do exist, it is my position that the employer should not be able 
to be use these kinds of technological means that are especially 
available to him or her as an employer to at all times creep the content 
of what an employee is doing on his or her social networking account, 
even if it is in the name of protecting a legitimate interest.297   
 Think of it as if the employee was acting in the physical world, as 
opposed to online.  An employer is neither physically able to watch 
everything an employee does, nor hear everything an employee says.  
For example, if an employee is cursing his or her employer’s name (and 
thus, damaging the employer’s reputation), the chances of an employer 
finding out about it can increase or decrease depending on certain 
                                                
297 Once again, an exception to this is situations in which the social 
networking activity is itself part of the employee’s job.  In this case, the 
standard should be, like at the pre-employment phase, that the 
employer is able to monitor this activity to the extent that is necessary 




factors.  If the employer is present, then it is likely they will see or hear 
it.  If the employee is in a very busy public place, there is a greater 
likelihood that someone may hear him or her and relay the information 
to the employer.  Even if the employee is speaking with only one co-
worker, there is a possibility that the co-worker may relay the 
information to the employer – this is certainly a risk taken by the 
employee.  However, in the physical world, the employee has a certain 
level of control in managing these risks – there exist spatial, acoustic, 
and territorial boundaries, and he or she is able to choose his or her 
audience based on the existence of these boundaries and control the 
content of what he or she is saying based the degree to which he or she 
trusts the audience he or she has.  An individual’s ability to make these 
decisions for oneself is considered to be part of an individual’s right to 
personal autonomy. 
 When thinking of it from an internalist perspective, the employee 
is navigating within the social networking site’s boundaries.  When an 
employee writes something on his or her Facebook page (for example, 
something that damages his or her employer’s reputation), the way he 
or she is navigating the site is that he or she is producing this 
information under the understanding that he or she has placed certain 
technological privacy limitations on the audience that can receive this 




networking account must be respected – if the employer is not a part of 
that intended audience, this should be respected.  Now, this is not to say 
that because the statements were written online, the employee should 
be somehow immune from facing any real-world consequences if the 
employer were to find out – that would be the Legal Immunity Thesis of 
the original Virtualist idea that existed in an era of online activity gone 
by.  What New Virtualism would dictate is that while the individual’s 
decision to write such statements on Facebook with particular privacy 
settings should, for the most part, be respected as a matter of personal 
autonomy (and the employer should generally be precluded from 
invading into the employee’s personal life without good reason), it is 
recognized that the borders between the online world and the physical 
world are permeable.  And by putting this information out into the 
online world, the employee is certainly taking a risk that someone may 
relay this information to the employer either orally or electronically, 
and this could very well have consequences for the employee in the 
physical world.  In this case, the employer should be able to react to 
social networking activity of employees – and the employer can only 
react if he or she knows that the activity occurred. 
What I mean by all of this is that employers should not be able go 
on “fishing expeditions,” or have a policy that they may simply monitor 




employer has legitimate, reasonable grounds to believe that an 
employee is engaging in some social networking activity that affects the 
interests of the employer (i.e. writing defamatory statuses about the 
employer for all of his or her Facebook friends to see, and one of those 
friends told the employer about it), there should be a way for the 
employer to access this information.  One way is for the employer to 
make inquiries in the physical world that do not involve the employer 
intruding upon the privacy of the employee via technological means (i.e. 
Screen Capturing or Keystroke Logging programs).  The employer could 
ask people whom he or she knows to be the employee’s Facebook friend 
about the employee’s activity.  The employer can ask that one of the 
employee’s Facebook friends copy and paste the employee’s Facebook 
activity to him or her.  This is completely reasonable.  There is, 
however, a wrinkle to this process.  If the employer is asking this 
information from another one of his or her employees, asking is a 
delicate issue that, in the situation, may be more akin to coercion.  As 
such, the employer should be able to ask other employees about the 
alleged activity (just as he or she can ask one employee about another 
employee’s activity in the physical world), but the employer should be 
precluded from asking that an employee copy and paste or actually 
show the alleged activity to the employer.  This does not adequately 




account.  Now, if the employee decides himself or herself to show the 
activity of the other employee to the employer, this is acceptable, as it is 
part of the risk Facebook users assume when posting information for 
other Facebook users to see – some of those users may relay that 
information to unwanted audiences.  So how, and from whom, the 
employer retrieves the information is very important.  This is the kind 
of explorations that is not currently happening during examinations of 
employment law issues arising out of social networking activity – there 
needs to be an assessment of the appropriateness of the manner in 
which the information was accessed. 
Despite an employer’s best efforts to gain access to the 
information, he or she may come away from these explorations empty-
handed, and the only way for the him or her to look into the Facebook 
activity of the employee is through the aforementioned technological 
means.  In such circumstances, this should be allowed in limited 
circumstances, and I can see two possible ways to go about allowing 
this. 
The first is an ex post facto assessment.  If the employer has 
legitimate, reasonable grounds to believe that the employee is engaging 
in social networking activity that is detrimental to the interests of the 
employer, the employer is then permitted to use technological means 




social networking activity of the employee.  In an effort to ensure that 
employers are not simply creeping an employee’s Facebook activity as a 
form of fishing expedition, when there is an employment law issue 
arising out of an employee’s social networking activity, the court or 
board hearing the issue needs to engage in discussion and analysis of 
the way in which the employer obtained the information at issue.  Key 
to this analysis will be whether the employer had a reasonable, 
legitimate reason to infringe upon the employee’s expectation of privacy.  
It is my belief, however, that this approach is not effective for the 
following reason: the only way the employer’s reasonable grounds for 
prying into the social networking activity of the employee will be 
examined is if it turns out that the employee’s activity was grounds for 
discipline, and the employee challenges that discipline.  But what about 
situations in which the employer was incorrect, and the employee has 
not actually engaged in such social networking activity?  Yes, there will 
be no discipline in such a situation, but the privacy infringement will 
still have occurred.  This opens up the possibility of more privacy 
infringements.  For this reason, I do not believe this approach 
adequately protects the employee’s privacy interests in his or her social 
networking activity. 
Once privacy is violated, it cannot be regained, and to monitor 




means without their knowledge or consent) is not unlike a wiretap.  For 
this reason, I believe that in order for an employer to use technological 
means like Keystroke Logging or Screen Capturing programs to monitor 
an employee’s social networking activity, the emloyer must receive prior 
authorization from some independent body (e.g. a Labour Relations 
Board).  To receive prior authorization from the independent body, the 
employer must be able to demonstrate that he or she has reasonable, 
legitimate grounds to believe that the employee is engaging in social 
networking activity that is worthy of discipline.  Furthermore, the 
authorization given by the independent body could appropriately limit 
the scope and extent to which the employer can look into the employee’s 
social networking activity.  The way the independent body would make 
the determination of whether to authorize the monitoring would be 
analogous to the way the Supreme Court of Canada treats admissibility 
of any records in which an individual has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy, such as personal diaries.  In determining when it is reasonable 
to demand access to said information, the court engages a balancing act 
that involves an assessment of the individual’s reasonable expectation 
of privacy and a weighing of that expectation against the legitimate 
need to interfere therein.298  In my opinion, this is the most effective 
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way to protect the employee’s privacy interest in his or her social 
networking activity, but still respect the fact that an employer may need 
to access this information in certain circumstances. 
What this amounts to is that the employer, if he or she finds out 
that such activity was conducted by an employee on a social networking 
site, should be able to respond to that activity appropriately; however, 
the law should certainly respect and protect the individual’s right to 
engage in social networking activity with the privacy contours of his or 
her choice as a matter of personal autonomy – within reason, the 
employee should be able to choose his or her audience.   
This is the extent to which social networking activity should be 
protected in the employment relationship – it should generally (not 
absolutely) be protected from unwanted and unwelcome employee 
monitoring on the part of the employer, but the employee should not be 
immune from the consequences that can result from participating in 
social networking activity.  This approach respects the reasonable 
privacy expectations individuals choose when they participate in social 
networking, it frees them to express themselves online without fear of 
constant supervision from their employer, and it respects the employer’s 
legitimate right to react should an employee do something that is 
detrimental to the employment relationship.  This is the balanced social 




secure to express ourselves and socialize as we see fit, but one that is 





CHAPTER 9 Conclusion 
As use of technology and the use of social networking increases, 
the risk presented to personal privacy correspondingly increases.  When 
it comes to the protection of an individual’s privacy interest in his or her 
social networking information in the employment context, we are not 
doing doing a very good job. 
At the pre-employment phase, Employment Standards Acts do 
not protect job candidates, except in very limited circumstances.  
Human rights and labour relations legislation, while they do extend to 
protect certain interests of job candidates, have significant issues with 
respect to proof when it comes to their practical efficacy in preventing 
employers from engaging in discriminatory or unfair labour practices as 
a result of social networking background checks.  Even legislation 
proposed specifically with the goal of protecting job candidates from 
being subject to unwanted social networking background checks at the 
Password level of invasiveness do not appropriately take consent 
concerns into account. 
The privacy legislation that is supposed to govern the extent to 
which an employer can collect social networking information about an 
employee or candidate is insufficient.  First of all, its jurisdictional 




collection, use, and distribution of information for employees or 
candidates in federally regulated industries, the public sector, the 
provincially regulated private sector in Alberta, BC or Quebec, and the 
legislated tort of invasion of privacy protects citizens in BC, Manitoba, 
Saskatchewan, and Newfoundland and Labrador to a very limited 
degree; however, those in the provincially regulated private sector 
outside of these jurisdictions receive no statutory privacy protection 
whatsoever.  Second, it is only in the public sector that the social 
networking information collected by an employer must be directly 
related to the employee or candidate’s job.  In the aforementioned 
statutes in Alberta and BC, there is no requirement that the employer 
receive the consent of the employee or candidate before collecting this 
information, and in all other privacy legislation applicable to the private 
sector (including the tort of invasion of privacy), the standard of what 
can be collected is a vague standard of “reasonableness.”  For all of those 
not protected by specific privacy legislation, there exists only the tort of 
“intrusion upon seclusion,” which only protects an individual from such 
intrusions that are highly offensive causing distress, humiliation, or 
anguish.  Considering the amount and nature of information that is 





When it comes to employment law disputes arising out of the use 
of social networking, arbitrators, courts and legal scholars are focused 
on the application of first principles of employment law to the social 
networking activity in question, and not addressing and analyzing the 
privacy issue that is at stake – the creeping by the employer of the 
employee’s social networking activity.  Rather, computer use policies are 
being relied upon by employers as a form of consent from the employee 
to allow the employer to monitor the employee’s computer activity.  
There has not been nearly enough consideration of the potential 
invasiveness of such a practice, and considering the interest the 
employer is seeking to protect, the reasonable limits that should be 
placed on an employer’s ability to monitor what an employee does on his 
or her work computer, or social networking sites generally. 
Social networking is a use of technology that is very intimately 
connected to a person’s sense of individuality and identity.  If it is to 
present any real benefit to individuals and society as a whole (and I 
think that it has great potential in this regard), it needs very careful 
and functional privacy protection.  Despite the problems that exist with 
our current approach, I think there is still a way for us to create an 
environment where people can use social networking to its full potential 
and privacy concerns are effectively mitigated.  To do so, however, 




Treating social networking information like property, and protecting it 
by giving individuals a right to “informational privacy’ is the wrong 
approach.  This has only led to an approach that does not effectively 
take into account the complicated dynamics of the employment 
relationship.  In this work I have attempted to argue that the principles 
of New Virtualism are a more appropriate conceptual basis upon which 
we should address this issue going forward. 
While New Virtualist principles provide a roadmap for the 
general, conceptual direction we should take in addressing this issue, 
the specific means to achieve the best regulation (be it, for example, 
specific legislation, changes to Employment Standards legislation, or 
the development of the common law) could be the subject of further 
study and exploration – this is the next step.  The first step to finding a 
solution, however, is acknowledging that a problem exists.  And when it 
comes to the privacy protection afforded to social networking 
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